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ABSTRACT
Will Analysts Learn From Other Analysts
Who Possess Superior Private Information?
by
SHI Hangyuan
Master of Philosophy

Based on a valuable testing venue in China where listed companies are required to
disclose corporate site visit records of financial analyst to the public, this study
examines whether analysts will learn from visiting analysts' forecasts that contain
superior private information. I find that visiting forecasts tend to attract more
analysts to issue forecasts in their aftermath than the prior forecasts issued by the
same analysts but without conducting corporate site visit (non-visiting forecasts).
The following effect is weaker when the visiting forecasts are more informative. In
addition, other analysts’ forecasts following the visiting forecasts tend to move closer
to the visiting forecasts than the forecasts following the non-visiting forecasts, with
the effects being stronger for more informative visiting forecasts. Furthermore,
followers experience a greater improvement in their forecast accuracy than the
non-followers. This effect is also stronger when the visiting forecasts are more
informative. Last but not the least, I find a decline in analyst forecast dispersion, an
increase in common information, and an improvement in forecast accuracy in the
period subsequent to the issuance of visiting analysts’ forecasts but no such effect for
non-visiting forecasts. Collectively, the results suggest that analysts have incentive to
learn from the forecasts that contain superior information and such learning activities
tend to improve the information environment of the visiting firms.
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Chapter 1. Introduction
It has been long documented that some analysts tend to follow other analysts to issue
forecasts even though brokerage houses and analysts can benefit from early forecasts
as it tends to associate with increased trading volume and commissions (e.g., Cooper
et al., 2001; Irvine, 2004; Jackson, 2005).

The following behaviors of analysts can be independent actions taken by analysts in
response to common information shocks (Clement et al., 2011; Schrand et al., 2014).
They can also be the results of social behaviors engaged by analysts including
herding (Trueman, 1994; Graham, 1999; Hong et al., 2000; Clement and Tse, 2005;
Beyer et al., 2010) and learning (Cooper et al., 2001; Clement et al., 2011; Schrand et
al., 2014).

On the social behaviors, existing studies focus primarily on analysts' herding
behavior, which involves analysts imitating the forecasts of other analysts by
following some traits of other analysts (such as experience or ability) (Hong et al.,
2000; Clement and Tse, 2005). Much fewer studies have been conducted on analysts'
learning behavior, which involves analysts actively processing and incorporating
others' information into their own forecasts (Greve, 2011). This gap in the literature
is particularly intriguing, as learning is a well-documented human tendency in the
psychology literature (Asch, 1952; Bandura 1963; Miller 2011). The scarcity of
research on this important issue is probably due to the difficulty in identifying the
1

information set possessed by different analysts. As a result, it is particularly
challenging for scholars to identify which analyst has superior private information
and examine the subsequent information flow among analysts.

In this study, I make use of a useful setting in China to investigate whether analysts
would learn from forecasts issued by other analysts who have superior private
information regarding the forecasting firms. Specifically, the Shenzhen Stock
Exchange (SZSE) has required the listed firms in China to disclose the record of
visiting financial analysts to the public from late 20061. Corporate site visit allows
analysts to observe the operation of the visiting firms and have private discussions
with management (Soltes 2014). Previous research has documented that the forecasts
issued by the visiting analysts after the site visits contain superior private information
(Cheng et al., 2015b). Using the corporate site visit data in China, Cheng et al.
(2015a) find the significant market reaction in the 3-day window centered on site
visits and conclude that site visit serves as an important type of information
acquisition event for analysts. These two studies confirm that corporate site visits
allow the visiting analysts to obtain relevant and more accurate information
regarding the earnings of the visiting firms. The disclosure of corporate site visits
therefore effectively reveals the superior private information possessed by the
visiting analysts and offers a valuable setting to examine whether analysts who have

1

There are two stock exchanges in China, the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) and the Shenzhen
Stock Exchange (SZSE). SHSE and SZSE has a total market cap of RMB 14.84 trillion and RMB
8.79 trillion respectively by the end of 2013.
2

not visited the firms (hereafter non-visiting analysts) will learn from the forecasts
issued by the visiting analysts (hereafter visiting forecasts)2.

I focus on non-visiting analysts' forecasts issued in the period subsequent to visiting
forecasts within a 30 days window to discern the possibility of the occurrence of
learning behaviors of non-visiting analysts. Such a focus may underestimate the
extent of learning that has occurred as some non-visiting analysts may learn from the
visiting forecasts but choose not to issue a forecast during my specified period. Some
analysts may also learn from the visiting forecasts and incorporate the information
into their forecasts regarding the earnings of other firms (due to intra-industry
information transfer) rather than the forecasts regarding the visiting firms.
Nevertheless, the forecasts issued by non-visiting analysts are observable and
measurable outcome of learning. Focusing on the outcome in the immediate
aftermath of the visiting forecasts can mitigate the influence of other information. If I
could still find evidence for the occurrence of learning by this sub-set of learning
behaviors, I would conclude with greater confidence that the visiting forecasts have
indeed induced learning among analysts.

As analysts may issue following forecasts independently or due to herding behaviors
2

Cheng et al. (2015a) argues that other individuals could get to know the occurrence of site visit
through the so-called “expert network”. Their evidence of significant market reaction around site visit
event further confirms the existence of such a network as the stock price movement surrounding site
visit is related to the information content of site visits. In addition, visiting analysts may mention their
site visit experiences in their analyst reports. Finally, from late 2012, SZSE requires firms to disclose
visiting analyst records in two working days after the visiting event, which officially disclose the
occurrence of visiting event in a timely manner.
3

rather than learning induced by the private information contained in the visiting
forecasts, I employ a difference-in-difference approach (DID) to discern the learning
effect. Specifically, I hold the visiting analysts-firm pair constant and compare two
groups of following forecasts, the following forecasts of the visiting forecast that
contain superior private information and the following forecasts of the prior
non-visiting forecast that contains no obvious private information. Holding the
analyst-firm pair constant helps to mitigate the confounding effects associated with
the tendency of analysts to herd to a particular analyst and/or a particular firm. If we
further assume that the distribution and the behavior of analysts who issue forecasts
independently are more or less the same for both the visiting and non-visiting
forecasts, the differences between the following forecasts of visiting forecasts and
the following forecast of the non-visiting forecasts can reasonably be attributed to the
incentive to learn as induced by the private information contained in the visiting
forecasts3.

I conduct four major set of tests to examine whether the visiting forecasts have
induced the learning behavior of non-visiting analysts. The first set of tests compares
the number of analysts who issue a forecast within 30 days after the issuance of the

3

Some might argue that in order to have a true difference-in-difference (DID), a control sample
during the same time period without corporate visit and visiting forecast is more appropriate given the
dynamic nature of Chinese stock market. The difference obtained from the control group can further
filter out the changes in forecasting behaviors of analysts over time (happened to both treated and
control group at the same time). To do this, I need to find a control group that matches both analyst
and form characteristics. However, it is extremely difficult to find such matches. More importantly,
my study focuses on the analysts’ forecasts issued during 6 months (at most) prior to the visiting
forecast. Results obtained from such a short window are less likely to be driven by major structural
changes in the Chinese stock market.
4

visiting forecasts with the corresponding number of followers for the non-visiting
forecasts. Consistent with the notion that visiting forecasts induce learning activities,
I find that visiting forecasts tend to attract more analysts to issue forecasts in their
aftermath than non-visiting forecasts. Moreover, I examine whether the change in the
number of followers between the visiting and non-visiting forecasts are associated
with the amount of relevant and accurate information regarding the earnings of the
visiting firms. I find a significant negative relation between the informativeness of
the visiting forecasts and the change in the number of followers. The result suggests
that more informative visiting forecasts discourage other analysts from issuing
following forecasts. A plausible explanation is that more informative visiting
forecasts reduce the possibility for other analysts to bring in additional information
and/or insight regarding the visiting firm and thus reduce their incentive to issue
following forecast.

My second set of tests examines how the visiting forecasts influence the content of
the following forecasts. To capture such inter-analyst influence, I utilize a method
developed by Cohn and Juergens (2014). Specifically, the method involves the
calculation of the difference between the visiting analysts forecast and the following
analyst’s most recent prior forecast, and then computes the fraction of this “gap”
closed by the following analyst’s subsequent revision. I find that the followers of the
visiting forecasts close the “gap” to a greater extent than the followers of the
non-visiting forecasts. Furthermore, the more informative the visiting forecasts, the
5

greater the “gap” that has been closed. The results indicate that the followers are
more willing to incorporate the information contained in the visiting forecasts into
their own forecasts if the visiting forecasts contain more useful information. The
significant relation between the informativeness of the visiting forecasts and the
forecasts of the followers suggests that the forecasts of the followers involve active
processing of the information contained in the visiting forecasts.

In addition to the “gap” closed, my third set of tests examines the accuracy of the
following forecasts in order to provide more evidence on the learning effectiveness
of non-visiting analysts'. Specifically, I compare the change in accuracy between
non-visiting analysts who have issued their forecasts before (non-followers) and
non-visiting analysts who have issued their forecasts after the issuance of the visiting
forecasts (followers). If the followers of visiting forecasts do learn from the visiting
forecasts and incorporate the useful information contained in the visiting forecasts,
they should experience a greater improvement in forecast accuracy relative to the
non-followers. The results are consistent with my prediction. Furthermore, I find that
the improvement in forecast accuracy of the following forecast of visiting forecast is
more pronounced when the visiting forecast is more informative. The result also
suggests that the followers of the visiting forecasts do actively process the
information contained in the visiting forecasts and incorporate that information into
their own forecasts.

6

Last but not least, I also examine how the learning of non-visiting analysts affects the
information environment of the visiting firms. I use three firm-level information
environment measures, analyst forecast dispersion, common information, and
accuracy of consensus forecast to examine the impact of learning.

Analyst forecast dispersion has been widely used to measure firm information
environment (Heflin et al., 2003, Byard et al., 2010). Higher forecast dispersion
indicates the existence of a larger disagreement among analyst. If the following
analysts do learn from the visiting forecasts, we should expect a decrease in analyst
forecast dispersion since the following analysts are simultaneously influenced by the
same visiting forecast. Consistent with my expectation, I find that the forecast
dispersion decreases in the period subsequent to the visiting forecasts. Furthermore,
there is no statistically significant change in forecast dispersion for the non-visiting
forecasts.

Barron et al. (1998) suggest that forecast dispersion of analysts contains both
common and private information. If following analysts do learn from the same
visiting forecasts, we should expect to see an increase in common information in the
period subsequent to the visiting forecasts. Consistent with my expectation, I find
that the common information increases in the period subsequent to the visiting
forecasts. For the non-visiting forecasts, I do not find any statistically significant
change in common information.
7

Lang and Lundholm (1996) suggest that firms with better disclosure quality tend to
have lower analyst forecast errors. Horton et al. (2013) find that the consensus
forecast errors decrease for firms that mandatorily adopt IFRS relative to forecast
errors of other firms. Similar to the prior literature, I also view an improvement in
forecast accuracy as an indicator of better information environment. If following
analysts do benefit from the visiting forecasts, which contain useful information, I
expect to see an improvement in forecast accuracy in the period subsequent to the
visiting forecasts. Consistent with my expectation, I find that the accuracy of
consensus forecast improves in the period subsequent to the visiting forecast while I
do not find any significant change for the non-visiting forecasts.

My study offers systematic evidence on whether analysts will learn from other
analysts' who possess superior private information. Unlike the vast literature on
analysts' herding behaviors, only a few studies have examined the learning activities
of analysts. The few existing studies tend to focus on how analysts learn from the
commonly available information rather than the private information of other analysts
(Clement et al., 2011; Schrand et al., 2014). The gap in the literature is probably
because it is very difficult to identify the private information possessed by different
analysts. Nevertheless, learning from others' superior private information and
knowledge is an equally important, if not more important, aspect of human learning
activities. My study fills this gap in the literature and helps to offer a more
8

comprehensive understanding of analysts' learning activities.

In a broader sense, my study also contributes to a better understanding of how
analysts produce earnings forecasts. Focusing on how superior private information is
transferred from one analyst to another analyst via learning activities of analysts, my
study highlights the inter-analysts information flow as a determinant of the frequency
and quality of analyst forecasts. Furthermore, to the extent that analyst forecasts can
shape investors' behaviors, studies on analysts' learning behaviors can also contribute
to an understanding of the information diffusion in financial markets.

In addition to academic value, my study also has practical a regulatory implication.
My findings suggest that requiring listed firms to disclose the records of private
communication with analysts may help to reveal the private information possessed
by analysts. The revelation of the information source can consequently induce
learning activities among analysts, which helps to improve the quality of analysts'
forecasts as well as the overall information environment of firms.

9

Chapter 2. Research Background

Prior studies have found that some analysts tend to follow other analysts to issue
forecasts, although a timely forecast can trigger greater trading volume and increased
commissions, which can benefit both brokerage firms and analysts (e.g., Cooper et
al., 2001; Irvine, 2004; Jackson, 2005). While the following behaviors can be a result
of independent actions of analyst without involving any connection between the
leading and following analysts, previous research has proposed two social behaviors,
namely herding and learning, that can explain why some analysts intentionally
follow others to issue earnings forecasts.

In this chapter, I first briefly review the literature on herding behaviors of analysts. I
will then review the existing studies on learning as well as the studies on corporate
site visit as an important information acquisition event for analysts. Lastly, I will
briefly discuss the institutional background on corporate site visit in China.

2.1. Herding of financial analysts
Herding refers to the tendency of following others based on a variety of decision
rules including “follow similar others”, “follow high status” or “follow the majority”
(Banerjee, 1992). The phenomenon of herding was first studied in psychology. For
example, Asch (1952) studied the relation between social environments and
individual’s decision behavior and observed that individuals often abandon their

10

private signal to rely predominantly on group opinion.

Early finance study describes herding as imitation behavior and often leads to
inefficient outcomes for the financial market as a whole. One of the undesirable
outcomes of herding is that it leads to the suboptimal use of valuable information and
result in inefficient decision making (Bikhchandani et al., 1992). Keynes (1936)
suggests that professional managers will "follow the herd" if they are concerned
about how others will assess their ability to make sound judgments. Scharfsterin and
Stein (1990) study the forces that can lead to herd behavior. They develop a
“learning” model and show that under certain circumstances, managers simply mimic
the investment decisions of other managers, ignoring substantive private information.
Trueman (1994) also suggest that analysts exhibit herding behavior, whereby they
release forecasts similar to those previously announced by other analysts, even when
their information does not justify this.

The vast literature on the herding behavior of financial analysts focuses primarily on
how different analysts’ incentives and characteristics are associated with the
tendency to herd. Scharfstein & Stein (1990), Trueman (1994) argue that analysts
manipulate their forecasts to get closer to the consensus in order to signal that their
information correlates with their peers. The principal idea is that to fail as a group
will not harm one’s reputation as much as being mistaken on one’s own. Collective
failure may be attributable to uncertainty in the environment. Hong et al. (2000) find
11

the consistent evidence that less experienced analysts are more concerned about their
reputations and, therefore, tend to herd more frequently. Clement and Tse (2005)
further demonstrate that analysts with more experience, high prior forecast accuracy,
less number of industry coverage, and from larger brokerage firm are less likely to
herd.

2.2. Learning of financial analysts
The basic assumption of the herding models is that “the action rather than
information that is visible to the public (Bikhchandani et al., 1992; Welch 1992).
Herders imitate other people's actions on the basis of the inferred information rather
than other people's actual information. Welch (2000) argues that analysts will be
more likely to herd when there is little information. In contrast to herding, learning
should involve direct possessing and incorporating of others' useful information into
one's own decision (Greve, 2011). Although learning is a well-documented human
tendency in the psychology literature (Asch 1952; Bandura, 1963), empirical studies
on analysts' learning activities are particularly scarce.

Theoretically, Chen (2007) suggests that analysts tend to decide the timing of their
forecasts strategically. Two major predictions of the model are (1) analyst will tend
to forecast later if he has a better ex ante reputation, and (2) he will tend to forecast
earlier if the quality of public information is lower. Guttman (2010) develops a
model that endogenizes the timing decision of analysts and analyzes their
12

equilibrium timing strategies. Its tradeoff theory considers the dimension of active
learning—a benefit of waiting. He concludes that analysts with a higher precision of
initial private information tend to forecast earlier, and analysts with higher learning
ability tend to forecast later in order to learn from the preceding forecasts that have
been issued by other analysts.

Although theoretical studies suggest some rationales for an analyst to learn from
other analysts, empirical evidence on analysts’ learning activities remains scarce.
Clement et al. (2011) use earnings announcement as a common information shock
and examine the timing of issuing a forecast. They examine how analysts issue
forecast based on two signals, stock returns and other analysts’ forecast. Using a
sample of 275,328 analysts from 1996 to 2005, their study shows that most analysts
quickly revise their forecasts after earnings announcement and their revisions are not
only correlated with their own forecast errors, but also with announcement period
returns and the average revision of the analysts who precede them. The more
informative returns and the average revision are, the more analysts’ own earnings
forecast revisions are correlated with these two signals. Moreover, analysts who are
most sensitive to a signal’s informativeness tend to demonstrate superior forecast
accuracy and investors respond strongly to the forecast revisions of analysts who
demonstrate this ability. Their results suggest that observing and learning from stock
prices and consensus forecast serve as one source of analyst expertise and the market
does recognize the importance of this type learning.
13

Schrand et al. (2014) investigate information diffusion after earnings announcement
by examining analysts’ forecast decision. Using analyst forecast data from 1994 to
2011, they study the timing of analyst forecast after the earnings announcement.
They consider three categories of factors associated with analysts’ forecast decision,
the ease of the forecasting task, analysts’ incentives, and learning. They show that
analyst who issues more timely forecast are associated with easier forecasting task
and have strong incentives to issue immediately (e.g., analyst from larger brokerage
house).

The study of Clement et al. (2011) examines whether analysts will learn from the
information commonly available in the market as reflected in the stock returns and
average revisions of other analysts. Schrand et al. (2014) discern the learning effect
by the timing of issuing forecasts by analysts who are responding to a common
information shock. None of the prior studies have examined whether analysts will
learn from other analysts who possess superior private information. This issue is
important because people will learn not only from the common wisdom but also from
the people who have superior private information and knowledge. Previous studies
have demonstrated that analysts obtain private information regarding firms from
different sources (e.g. Barter 1998; Valentine 2010; Soltes 2014). Therefore, it is
important to examine whether analysts will learn from other analysts who possess
superior private information and how such learning activity and how such learning
14

will influence the information environment. My study fills this gap in the literature.

2.3. Corporate site visits as an important information acquisition event for
financial analyst
Financial analysts play a critical role in the capital market. They serve as information
intermediaries and facilitate the communication with investors (Healy and Palepu
2001). One important task of financial analyst is to generate research report and issue
earnings forecasts for companies. Thus, financial analysts need to collect information
from different channels to develop an insightful analysis of the company. They not
only need to analyze publicly available information (e.g., macro economy data, firm
financial data, industry report) but also need to incorporate the information they
acquired from other channels (e.g., conference calls, meeting with management,
company visits).

Historically, the importance of private information acquisition has well been
recognized. Barter (1998)’s semi-structured interviews reveal that analysts rate direct
contact with the company as the most important sources of information. Analysts
benefit substantially from meeting directly with companies as it helps them to gain
unique insights regarding the firm’s operation and strategy (Valentine 2010). Based
on a survey of financial analysts, Brown et al. (2015) find that company or plant
visits are rated second most useful type of direct contact with management for the
purpose of issuing stock recommendations. Around 50% of respondents considered
15

company or plant visits are useful for the purpose of generating earnings forecasts.

Access to management remains an important source of analyst’s information
advantage. Jung et al. (2014) study analyst’s interest, measured by the onset of
analysts who do not cover a firm but participate on that firms’ earnings conference
call, and conclude that analyst interest is associated with positive future earnings and
stock returns. By using a novel dataset of analysts’ private interaction with
management, Soltes (2014) concludes that private interaction with management is an
important communication channel for analysts. Green et al. (2014) study
broker-hosted investor conferences and conclude that participating analysts have
superior access to management and obtain information from such events. Recent
studies directly investigate the effect of corporate site events and conclude that
corporate site visits are an important type of information acquisition activities and
visiting analysts also improve their forecast accuracy afterward (Cheng et al., 2015a,
Cheng et al., 2015b). In summary, previous studies suggest that analysts can obtain
valuable private information from different types of private communications with
firms. Therefore, it is important to examine whether other analysts will learn from
the analysts who possess superior private information.

2.4. Institutional background on corporate site visits in China
Although corporate site visits are important information sources for analysts, firms
are not required to disclose such information to the general public. The Shenzhen
16

Stock Exchange (SZSE) in China pilots a new scheme of fair disclosure and requires
listed firms to disclose investor activity records to the general public starting from
August 20064. This disclosure requirement provides a testing venue on how analysts
incorporate important private information acquired from corporate visits into their
earnings forecasts.

The disclosure includes the date of investor activity event, the format of the event,
the place where the event took place, participating bodies and the main topics
discussed during the event. Site visit accounts for the majority of investor activity
format while email exchanges, investor conference, road shows, press conference,
sell-side broker conferences also show up occasionally. Appendix A provides an
example of investor activity records. For this study, I only focus on the site visit
events conducted by financial analysts and Table 1 shows the sample selection
procedures. I exclude investor activities that are not conducted by the financial
analyst (e.g., Feb 15 record in Appendix A) or the format of the visit is not a site visit
(e.g., May 7 record in Appendix A). In addition, I also exclude site visit conducted
by financial analysts who are not covered in China Stock Market and Accounting
Research (CSMAR) database.

Cheng et al. (2015b)’s field interviews reveal that the site visits immediately following semi-annual
and annual reports are initiated by firms while all other site visits are initiated by investors.
4

17

Chapter 3. Hypothesis Development and Empirical Results

3.1. Introduction
Analysts have the incentive to learn from the forecasts issued by other analysts only
when the others' forecasts contained superior private information. In my context,
non-visiting analysts have the incentive to learn from visiting analysts only when
visiting analysts obtain valuable information from site visits and the forecasts issued
by visiting analysts contain relevant and accurate information regarding the earnings
of visiting firms.

Also using the corporate site visit data in China, Cheng et al. (2015a) find the
significant market reaction in the 3-day window centered on site visits and conclude
that site visit serves as an important type of information acquisition activity for
analysts. Cheng et al. (2015b) further investigate the valuable information contained
in the visiting forecasts by examining the change in forecast accuracy between
visiting and non-visiting forecast. They find that the improvement of forecast
accuracy is more pronounced for visiting forecast than non-visiting forecasts, which
supports the notion that visiting forecasts contain more relevant and accurate
information regarding the earnings of the target firms. Therefore, visiting forecasts
satisfy the precondition for the occurrence of learning activity among analysts and
offer a valuable venue to test whether other non-visiting analysts will learn from
visiting forecasts.
18

In this chapter, I conduct four major sets of analyses to discern whether and how
non-visiting analysts will learn from the forecast issued by visiting analysts. In the
first set of analysis, I examine whether visiting forecasts attracts more non-visiting
analysts to issue forecasts in the period subsequent to the issuance of visiting
forecasts than a non-visiting forecast issued by the same visiting analyst regarding
the earnings of the same visiting firm. The second set of analysis examines whether
the content of the following analysts has been influenced by visiting forecasts. While
the third set of analysis investigates whether the forecasts after the issuance of the
visiting forecasts experience larger improvement in forecast accuracy than the
forecasts issued before the issuance of the visiting forecasts, the last set of analysis
studies whether and how the learning activities of analysts have improved the
information environment of the forecasting firms.

19

3.2. Followers of visiting and non-visiting forecasts
3.2.1. Introduction
In this section, I examine whether the visiting forecasts issued by visiting analysts
have induced more analysts to issue forecasts in the subsequent period than the
non-visiting forecasts. If visiting forecasts contain superior information and the
information has induced non-visiting analysts to learn from the visiting forecasts, I
expect to see an increase in the number of analysts who issue their forecasts in the
period subsequent to the visiting forecasts, when comparing to the non-visiting
forecasts (that contains no obvious private information). I also examine how the
change in the number of followers is related to the amount of relevant firm-specific
information contained in the visiting forecasts.

3.2.2. Hypothesis development
Theoretically, other analysts may issue forecasts in the period subsequent to the
issuance of visiting forecasts independently, or as a result of social behaviors
including herding and/or learning. The same logic applies to the situation of
non-visiting forecasts. However, visiting forecasts contain more relevant and
accurate information regarding the earnings of the visiting firms while non-visiting
forecasts do not have such informational advantages. If the private information
contained in the visiting forecasts creates an incentive for non-visiting analysts to
learn from the visiting forecasts, this additional incentive will lead more analysts to
issue forecasts for the period subsequent to the issuance of visiting forecasts, when
20

comparing with the case of non-visiting forecasts. As a result, I set up the following
hypothesis to test the above argument:
H1a: Holding analysts-firm pair constant, visiting forecasts attract more followers
than non-visiting forecasts do.

In addition, I also examine how the change in the number of followers is related to
the amount of new relevant information contained in the visiting forecasts. This
question is important for two reasons. Firstly, this relation is important for
determining whether the change in the number of followers is related to analysts'
learning behaviors. Active learning by analysts must involve direct processing of the
information contained in the visiting forecasts, which predicts a significant relation
between the number of followers and the information content of the visiting forecasts.
Independent and/or herding behaviors, however, do not have definite predictions on
this relation.

Secondly, the relation between the information contained in the visiting forecasts and
other analysts' decision to follow is theoretically unclear and remains an important
empirical question for understanding the learning behaviors of analysts. On one hand,
a visiting forecast containing new information allows non-visiting analysts to obtain
more information from the forecast. This may help other analysts to understand
better the visiting firm and prompt more analysts to issue following forecasts. On the
analysts' incentive to learn from public information including stock prices and
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analysts' forecasts consensus, Clement et al. (2011) find that analysts have a greater
learning incentive if stock price and others’ forecasts are informative. However, a
visiting forecast containing new information may also reduce the possibility for other
analysts to bring in additional information and/or insight, which might reduce their
incentive to issue following forecasts. In fact, Clement and Tse (2005) show that
analysts with more experience and strong ability are more likely to issue forecast
deviating from consensus (i.e., bold forecast) in order to produce “new” information
to the market. Therefore, the exact relation remains an empirical question.
Nevertheless, I propose the following hypothesis for empirical testing:
H1b: There is a negative relation between the new information contained in the
visiting forecasts and the number of followers in the period subsequent to the
issuance of visiting forecasts.

3.2.3. Sample selection and research design
I employ a difference-in-difference approach (DID) to discern whether visiting
forecasts attract more followers than non-visiting forecasts. Specifically, I hold the
visiting analyst-firm pair constant and compare two groups of analysts: the followers
of visiting forecasts that contain superior private information and the followers of
same visiting analyst’s prior non-visiting forecast that contains no obvious private
information. Since the difference-in-difference approach holds the visiting
analyst-firm pair constant, this can help to control for other analysts' incentives to
herd to the forecasts issued by a particular analyst and/or the forecasts relating to a
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particular firm (Hong et al., 2000; Clement and Tse 2005)5. By adopting this strategy,
the change in the number of followers between visiting and non-visiting forecast
should be more likely caused by the learning incentive of other analysts as induced
by the private information obtained by the visiting analysts.

Figure 1 and Table 2 depicts the procedures and timeline for identifying my testing
sample. I hand-collect the data on analysts’ site visits for the period of 2007 to 2013
from the quarterly and annual reports of firms listed in SZSE. Following Cheng et al.
(2015b), I combine site visit happened on adjacent dates as one event and end up
with 20,811 firm-level site visit observations. Furthermore, visiting forecasts are
identified as the forecasts issued by visiting analysts within 30 days after site visit
event because such focus could ensure that visiting analysts forecast reveals the
information observed from the visiting event6. This step reduces the sample to 6,993
visiting forecast observations. I only keep the first visiting forecast if the site visit is
conducted by multiple analysts and end up with 5,791 visiting forecasts observations.
To identify the followers, I focus on other analysts' forecasts issued in the period
subsequent to visiting analysts’ forecast within a 30 days window. That is, the
number of follower for visiting forecast is defined as the number of analysts who
issued forecast within 30 days after the issuance of the visiting forecast. I further
require visiting analyst to issue at least one forecast during the 6 months prior to the

5

Holding analyst-firm pair constant can also mitigate the potential endogeneity problem arising from
analysts’ tendncy to visit a particular firm or firms’ tendency to choose a particular analyst to visit.
6
Cheng et al. (2015b) also use 30 days window to identify visiting forecasts.
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visiting forecast in order to identify the non-visiting forecast. The number of
followers for the non-visiting forecast is then defined in the same way. After
dropping observation with missing values in controls, the final sample includes 1,490
visiting forecasts observations from 2007 to 2013.

To test H1a, I use the univariate test to compare the number of followers for both
visiting and non-visiting forecast. To test H2b, I use the following regressions to
investigate how the change in the number of followers is related to the information
contained in the visiting forecasts, after controlling for a host of analyst and firm
characteristics:

ln_change = α + β1 accuracy_change + β2 firm_exp + β3 star_dummy + β4 broker_szie +
β4 ana_firm_coverage + β5 Revenue_growth + β6 loss_dummy + β7 tangibility +
β8 manu_dummy + β9 b2m + β10 mkv + ε

(1)

d_change = α + β1 accuracy_change + β2 firm_exp + β3 star_dummy + β4 broker_szie +
β4 ana_firm_coverage + β5 Revenue_growth + β6 loss_dummy + β7 tangibility +
β8 manu_dummy + β9 b2m + β10 mkv + ε

(2)

Equations 1 and 2 represent two different ways to measure the change in the number
of followers. In equation 1, ln_change measures the change in the number of
followers for visiting analysts (computed as the log transformation of one plus the
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number of followers for the visiting forecast minus the log transformation of one plus
the number of followers for the non-visiting forecast). In equation 2, d_change is
another measure of the change in the number of followers for visiting analysts and is
a dummy variable that equals to 1 if the number of followers for the visiting forecast
is larger than the number of followers for the non-visiting forecast and equals to 0
otherwise.

Cheng et al. (2015b) support that visiting forecasts do contain valuable information
by demonstrating that the improvement in forecast accuracy of the visiting forecasts
is more pronounced relative to the non-visiting forecasts. That is, they use the
improvement in forecast accuracy of the forecasts of the visiting analysts to capture
the existence and the amount of new and useful information obtained by the visiting
analysts during the corporate site visit. Following their study, I also proxy for the
amount of new information contained in the visiting forecasts by using the
improvement in forecast accuracy of the visiting forecasts relative to the non-visiting
forecasts. Specifically, the variable of interest is accuracy_change, which is
computed as the scaled forecast error of the visiting forecast minus the scaled
forecast error of the non-visiting forecast. H1b hypothesizes that the coefficient of
accuracy_change is positive.

Following prior studies, I control for other variables that affect the incentives of
analysts to issue following forecasts. In particular, I control the variables that may
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induce analysts to herd to other analysts. Analysts with more experience, high ability,
and from larger brokerage firm are less likely to herd (Hong et al., 2000; Clement
and Tse, 2005). Thus, I include a few analyst characteristics that affect analyst’s
tendency to follow firm_exp measures analyst’s firm specific experience and is
computed as the number of years between an analyst’s first forecast for firm i and
his/her current forecast for firm i. star_dummy is a dummy variable that equals to one
if the analyst is ranked as the star analyst by the New Fortune magazine in the
previous year. broker_size measures the size of the brokerage firm and is computed
as the number of analysts working for the brokers in a specific year.
ana_firm_coverage is computed as the number of firms analyst is assigned to follow
in a specific year.

Cheng et al. (2015b) find that analysts benefit more when visiting manufacturing
firms and firms with high tangible assets. Therefore, I include both manu_dummy
and tangibility to control for the effectiveness of site visit. manu_dummy is a dummy
variable that equals to one if the firm is a manufacturing firm, and 0 otherwise while
tangibility is computed as the ratio of PP&E over total assets. Lastly, I also include
some other firm characteristics that can affect the influence of visiting forecast and
site visit choices, including revenue_growth that measures the revenue growth of the
firm and is computed as the revenue in year t divided by the revenue in year t-1,
loss_dummy that is a dummy variable that equals to one if the net income is negative
in year t, and 0 otherwise, b2m that is the book-to-market ratio and is computed as
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the book value of equity divided by the market value of equity, and mkv that is the
firm size and is computed as the log transformation of the market value of equity of
firm. I also include industry and year fixed effects in the regression model.

3.2.4. Univariate test for testing H1a
Panel A of Table 3 reports the univariate test of the number of followers for visiting
and non-visiting forecast. The table shows that the average number of follower for
visiting forecast is larger than the number of follower for the non-visiting forecast
(2.44 vs 1.51). The difference is statistically significant at 1 percent level.
Specifically, on average, the number of follower increases by almost 1 for visiting
forecasts, which represents an increase of about 60 percent. This result is consistent
with H1a, which indicates that visiting forecasts induce more followers than
non-visiting forecasts do.

Panel B of Table 3 presents the summary statistics of the variables included in my
estimation of equations 1 and 2. The two variables that measure the change in the
number of followers (i.e., d_change and ln_change) are all positive on average. The
average number of firm experience of analyst is 1.8 years. This is probably because
the financial analyst is a new profession in China and many analysts have just
acquired their professional qualifications and recently entered into the industry. The
average brokerage firm size is 44 analysts, while the average number of firms an
analyst is assigned to follow is 23 firms. For firm characteristics, the median of
27

revenue growth rate is about 24%, the average book-to-market ratio is around 0.3 and
the average market capitalization is roughly 6.7 billion RMB.

3.2.5. Regression analysis for testing H1b
Table 4 reports the regression results for equation 1 and 2. Specifically, the
coefficient of accuracy_change is significantly positive. Since accuracy_change is
computed as the accuracy change between visiting forecast and prior non-visiting
forecast, a negative value implies an increase in forecast accuracy while a positive
value implies a decrease in forecast accuracy. Therefore, the results show that an
increase in the private information obtained by the visiting analysts is associated with
a decrease in the number of followers of visiting forecast. In other words, visiting
forecasts containing more new information regarding the visiting firms actually
discourage other analysts from issuing following forecasts.

Regarding variables of analyst and firm characteristics that have been demonstrated
by prior studies that affect analysts' herding behavior, I do not find many significant
results. Only firm_exp and b2m are significant in equation 1 and 2 respectively,
implying that more experienced visiting analyst and low growth firms are associated
with an increase in the number of followers. The lack of significant results on
analysts and firm characteristics but the significant relation of information contained
in the forecasts further suggests that the change in the number of followers might be
associated with learning rather than herding motives.
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3.3. The influence of visiting forecasts on following forecasts
3.3.1. Introduction
The previous section shows that visiting forecast does attract more following
forecasts. This section further examines how the visiting forecasts influence the
content of the following forecasts. Specifically, I utilize a method as developed by
Cohn and Juergens (2014) to gauge the extent to which a new forecast issued by an
analyst causes the other analyst to revise his/her forecast towards the new forecast. If
the followers of the visiting forecasts do learn from the visiting forecasts, I expect to
observe following forecasts moving towards visiting forecasts considerably.

3.3.2. Hypothesis Development
One distinctive characteristic of learning is that it involves analysts actively
processing and incorporating others' information into their own forecasts (Greve,
2011). If followers have processed the information contained in a visiting forecast
and incorporated that information into their own forecasts, the content of the
following forecasts will be significantly influenced by the visiting forecasts. To
capture such inter-analyst influence, Cohn and Juergens (2014) suggest a method to
examine the difference in the content of the forecasts issued by two different analysts
(referred as the “gap”). Specifically, a “gap” represents the difference of forecasts
between two analysts and if the “gap” becomes smaller after the issuance of a new
forecast by one analyst, we can infer that the analyst who issues the new forecast has
been influenced by the other analyst. Applying this method to my context, the gap is
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the difference between the visiting analyst’s forecast and the following analyst’s
most recent prior forecast. I then compute the fraction of this “gap” that is closed by
the following analyst’s subsequent revision. Revision is defined as the difference
between following analyst’s forecast and his/her most recent prior forecast. Gap
closed is then defined as revision divided by “gap”. This is the fraction of the gap
that has been closed when the following analyst revises his/her forecast. It captures
the degree to which the following analyst moves towards the visiting analyst after
processing and incorporating the information contained in the visiting forecasts.
Appendix B shows a detailed numeric example. Analyst i issued an EPS forecast (i.e.,
visiting forecast) of $1.15 on June 1, 2009 after the site visit. Analyst j revises his
EPS forecast on June 15 from $0.8 (May 5, 2009) to $1.05. In this case, gap equals to
+$0.35 ($1.15-$0.8) and revision equals to +$0.25 ($1.05-$0.8). gap_closed equals
to +0.71 ($0.25/$0.35). We could interpret as analyst j closed 71% of the $0.35 gap
between the visiting forecast and his most recent forecast. A positive value of
gap_closed indicates that the following analyst has been influenced by the visiting
forecast.

If the private information contained in the visiting forecasts has induced the
followers to incorporate the information into their own forecasts while non-visiting
forecasts do not have such informational effect, I expect that the following forecasts
will be influenced more by the visiting forecasts and move towards the visiting
forecasts to a greater extent than when the following forecasts were influenced by
30

non-visiting forecasts do. Furthermore, if the “gap” closed is due to the processing of
information contained in the visiting forecasts rather than non-informational
processing reasons, I expect that the “gap” will be closed to a greater extent when the
visiting forecasts contain more relevant and accurate information regarding the
earnings of the visiting firms. The above discussion leads to the following two
hypotheses:
H2a: On average, followers of the visiting forecast close the “gap” to a greater extent
than the followers of the non-visiting forecast.
H2b: On average, the more relevant and accurate information regarding the earnings
of the visiting firms visiting forecast contains, the greater the “gap” that will be
closed.

3.3.3. Sample selection and research design
Figure 2 depicts the procedure and timeline for identifying the sample for testing the
above two hypotheses. Visiting forecasts are identified as forecasts issued by visiting
analysts within the 30 days after visiting event. Following forecasts are identified as
the forecasts issued by non-visiting analysts within 30 days after the issuance of the
visiting forecast. To calculate the gap, I further select the followers who have issued
a forecast during the 6 months prior to the following forecast.

A non-visiting forecast is identified as the visiting analyst’s most recent forecast
regarding the same firm during the 6 months prior to the visiting forecast. The
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corresponding following forecasts and followers’ prior forecast are identified by
using the same procedures as above. The final sample includes 1,526 visiting analyst
observations from 2007 to 2013. My sample construction holds the visiting analyst
and firm pair constant. This helps to address the concern that the characteristics of
analysts and/or firms, rather than the visiting forecasts have actually influenced the
following forecasts.

gap_closed is winsorized at 1st and 99th percentiles to mitigate the influence of
extreme values. Following Cohn and Juergens (2014), I then use the following
regressions to estimate the influence of visiting forecasts on the following forecasts:

gap_closed = α + β1 interval + β2 interval2 + β3 interval3 + ε

(3)

gap_closed = α + β1 accuracy_change + β2 horizon_change + β3 firm_exp +
β4 star_dummy + β5 broker_szie + β6 ana_firm_coverage + β7 Revenue_growth +
β8 loss_dummy + β9 tangibility + β10 manu_dummy + β11 b2m + β12 mkv + ε

(4)

In equation 3, interval is defined as the difference between the date of the visiting
analyst’s forecast and the date of the following analyst’s forecast. interval measures
the amount of common information available between the two forecasts and the
longer the interval, the more the common information. Controlling the amount of
common information helps to discern the effect caused by the information contained
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in the visiting forecast. interval2 is the squared term of interval while interval3 is the
quadratic term of interval. The second and third powers of the interval are used to
control a nonlinear relationship that could bias the intercept estimates. The intercept
from the regression captures how much the following forecasts have revised towards
the visiting forecasts. I estimate equation 3 for visiting forecasts and non-visiting
forecasts separately to discern their respective influences on their following forecasts.
H2a hypothesizes that the intercept for visiting forecasts is greater than the intercept
for non-visiting forecasts.

In equation 4, I regress gap_closed on different analyst and firm characteristics. The
variable of interest as hypothesized by H3b is accuracy_change, which measures the
amount of relevant and accurate information contained in the visiting forecast and is
defined in the same way as in the previous section. horizon_change is defined as log
transformation of the difference in forecasting horizon between following analyst’s
two forecasts. This variable measures the change in common information during that
period. The longer the horizon between following analyst’s two forecasts, the more
common information one would expect. This variable helps to mitigate the influence
of common information on the following analysts' revisions. Other variables are
defined in the same way as in the previous section.

3.3.4. Univariate test
Panel A of Table 5 reports the univariate test of the influence of visiting forecast.
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The table shows that the gap_closed for visiting forecast is 0.56 while the
gap_closed for the non-visiting forecast is 0.33 and both are statistically significant.
The results indicate that on average, the forecasts following visiting forecast closes
56% of the previous gap and is much larger than the gap that has been closed for the
forecasts following non-visiting forecast (i.e., 33%). This result is consistent with the
notion that the visiting forecast has exerted greater influence on the content of
following forecasts than non-visiting forecasts. Nevertheless, the univariate results
have not controlled for the common information that may influence the amount of
gap closed.

Panel B of Table 5 presents the summary statistics of the variables included in
equations 4. The mean of accuracy_change is negative, which implies that on
average, visiting forecast provides positive amount of relevant and accurate
information regarding the earnings of the firm. Other control variables are all
comparable to the sample in the previous chapter. The average number of analyst’s
firm experience is 1.95 years. The average brokerage firm size is 44, while the
average number of firms an analyst is assigned to follow is 23. For firm
characteristics, the median of revenue growth rate is about 24%, the average
book-to-market ratio is around 0.3 and the mean market capitalization is roughly 10
billion RMB.
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3.3.5. Regression analysis
Table 6 reports the regression results for equation 3. Columns 1 and 2 show the
results for non-visiting forecasts. Columns 3 and 4 show the results for visiting
forecasts. For both visiting and non-visiting forecasts, I estimate the model by using
the first power of interval (Columns 1 and 3), and then using the three powers of
interval further to control the nonlinearities (Columns 2 and 4). As shown in the table,
the coefficients of all inrevals are not significant, suggesting that the main influence
comes from the forecast itself but not the common information that changes over
time. For the results relating to the visiting forecasts, Column 3 and 4 indicate that
the constants are all significantly positive at 1 percent level. The results suggest that
66% and 54% of the gap between visiting forecast and the following analyst’s prior
forecast has been closed by his revision. For the non-visiting forecasts, the constant
term is marginally significant in column 1 and not significant in column 2. Overall,
the results suggest that non-visiting forecast does not significantly influence the
content of the following forecast. The comparison between the influence of visiting
and non-visiting forecast shows that visiting forecast is much more influential to
following analyst than non-visiting forecasts. The results are consistent with the
notion that visiting forecasts contain useful information and have influenced the
visiting forecasts.

Table 7 reports the regression results for testing H3b. The main variable of interest is
accuracy_change.

Consistent

with

my
35

expectation,

the

coefficient

of

accuracy_change is statistically negative, implying that following forecasts move
closer to visiting forecast when visiting forecast contains more relevant and accurate
information regarding the earnings of the firms. The results indicate that the
followers are more willing to incorporate the information contained in the visiting
forecasts into their forecasts if the visiting forecasts contain more useful information.
The significant relation between the information contained in the visiting forecasts
and the amount of gap that has been closed suggest that followers are likely to have
involved in the active processing of the information contained in the visiting
forecasts.

In terms of variables of analyst and firm characteristics, the only significant variable
is brokersize. The result implies that following forecasts tend to move closer to
visiting forecast when visiting analyst comes from larger brokerage firms. The
coefficients of other firm and analysts characteristics that have been shown to
influence analysts' herding behavior are statistically insignificant. In conjunction
with the significant relation between the information contained in the visiting
forecasts and the amount of gap that has been closed, the generally lack of significant
relation between firm and analysts characteristics and the amount of gap that has
been closed further suggest that the amount of gap that has been closed is more likely
to be caused by learning rather than herding behaviors of the following analysts.
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3.4. Accuracy change of followers and non-followers
3.4.1. Introduction
The previous section shows that visiting forecasts have significantly influenced the
content of following forecasts. This section aims to provide evidence on how
following analysts benefit from the content of visiting forecast. Specifically, I
compare the change in forecast accuracy of two groups of analysts: analysts who
issue forecasts after the issuance of visiting forecasts (followers) and analysts who
issue forecasts before the visiting forecasts (non-followers). If following analysts do
learn from the content and information contained in the visiting forecast and
incorporate that information into their own forecasts, I expect followers of visiting
forecast to show a greater improvement in forecast accuracy than non-followers do.

3.4.2. Hypothesis development
Even though previous analyses show that visiting forecast attracts more followers
and the followers’ forecasts move towards visiting forecast, whether followers do
benefit from the information contained in the visiting forecasts is still an empirical
question. If followers effectively process and incorporate the information contained
in the visiting forecasts, I expect to observe followers of the visiting forecasts to be
associated with a greater improvement in forecast accuracy than the non-followers.
Furthermore, if the improvement in accuracy is due to the processing of information
contained in the visiting forecasts, the improvement in accuracy of the following
forecast is expected be positively related to the amount of relevant and accurate
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information contained in the visiting forecasts. I therefore formulate the following
two hypotheses for empirical testing:
H3a: On average, the improvement in forecast accuracy is more pronounced for the
following forecasts of visiting forecast than the non-following forecasts of visiting
forecasts.
H3b: On average, the improvement in forecast accuracy of the following forecast of
visiting forecasts is more pronounced when the visiting forecast contains more
relevant and accurate information regarding the earnings of the firm.

3.4.3. Sample selection and research design
Figure 3 depicts the procedures and timeline for identifying the sample for testing
H3a and H3b. Similar to the procedures adopted in the previous sections, I identify
visiting forecasts as the forecasts issued by visiting analysts within 30 days after
visiting event. Followers are identified as the forecasts issued within 30 days after
the issuance of the visiting forecast. Non-followers are identified as the forecasts
issued during 30 days before the issuance of the visiting forecasts. I further require
followers and non-followers to issue at least one forecast regarding the same firm
during 6 months prior to the current forecast. The final sample includes 3,483 analyst
observations from 2007 to 2013.

To test H3a, I use univariate analysis to compare the change in accuracy for both
followers and non-followers. To test H3b, I use the following regressions to
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investigate how the accuracy change of the followers is related to the information
contained in the visiting forecasts:

∆accuracy = α + β1 follower_visit + β2 accuracy_change + β3 horizon_change +
β4 firm_exp + β5 star_dummy + β6 broker_szie + β7 ana_firm_coverage +
β8 revenue_growth + β9 loss_dummy + β10 tangibility + β11 manu_dummy + β12 b2m +
β13 mkv + ε

(5)

∆accuracy = α + β1 follower_visit + β2 accuracy_change_d + β3 firm_exp_d +
β4 star_dummy_d + β5 broker_szie_d + β6 ana_firm_coverage_d +
β7 revenue_growth_d + β8 loss_dummy_d + β9 tangibility_d + β10 manu_dummy_d +
β11 b2m_d + β12 mkv_d + 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + ε

(6)

where ∆accuracy measures the change in forecast error and is computed as the
difference between forecast error of analyst i and his forecast during 6 months prior
to the current forecast scaled by the stock price at the beginning of the year for a
given firm and fiscal year. follower_visit is a dummy variable that equals to one if
the forecast is identified as a following forecast of visiting forecast, and 0 otherwise.
The coefficient of this variable should be negative if H4a is confirmed.

To test H3b, the variable of interest is accuracy_change, which measures the
informativeness of the visiting forecast and is defined in the same way as in the
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previous chapter. Other variables are also defined in the same way as in the previous
chapter. horizon_change is computed as log transformation of the difference in
forecasting horizon between analyst’s prior and current forecast. The change in
forecasting horizon is needed because prior study has shown that forecasts issued
closer to earnings announcements are more accurate than those issued earlier
(Clement 1999). In equation 6, I also include the interaction terms of different
characteristics and the dummy of following forecast of visiting forecast. This model
helps to examine whether learning effectiveness of followers is related to the
information contained in the visiting forecasts. The coefficient of this interaction
term should be positive if H3b is supported. Other control variables are defined in the
same way as in the previous sections.

3.4.4. Univariate test for testing H3a
Panel A of Table 8 reports the univariate test of change in forecast accuracy for both
followers and non-followers. The table shows that both analyst groups experience an
improvement in accuracy. However, the improvement of following forecast of
visiting forecast is more pronounced (0.0031 vs. 0.0014), and the difference is
statistically significant at 1 percent l level. The result lends support to my H3a.
Moreover, following forecast of visiting forecast has higher forecast error in the prior
period but becomes more accurate after the issuance of the visiting forecasts. Both
differences are statistically significant at 1 percent level. These results are consistent
with my prediction that following forecasts of visiting forecast do benefit from the
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visiting forecast.

Panel B of Table 8 presents the summary statistics of the key variables included in
the regression models to test H3a and H3b. The mean of ∆accuracy is negative,
implying that on average, both groups of analysts experience an improvement in
forecast accuracy. The mean of accuracy_change is negative, implying that on
average, visiting forecast provides more accurate information regarding the firms'
actual earnings. Other control variables are all comparable to the samples in the
previous chapters. The average number of firm experience is 1.88 years. The average
brokerage firm size is 42, the average number of firms an analyst is assigned to
follow is 22. For firm characteristics, the median of revenue growth rate is about
24%, the average book-to-market ratio is around 0.26 and the mean market
capitalization is roughly 9.3 billion RMB.

3.4.5. Regression analysis for testing H3b
Column 1 of Table 9 reports the regression results for testing H3a. Consistent with
the results from the univariate test, the coefficient of the dummy variable for
following forecast of visiting forecast (follower_visit) is statistically negative at 1
percent level, suggesting that the improvement in forecast accuracy is more
pronounced for followers of visiting forecast compared to non-followers of visiting
forecast. Column 2 shows the results when I add one additional interaction term (i.e.,
accuracy_change_d) to equation 5. The coefficient between ∆accuracy and
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accuracy_change_d is statistically positive, implying that the accuracy of the
following forecasts improves more when visiting forecasts contain more relevant and
accurate information regarding the earnings of the visiting firms. In column 3, I
include all the interaction terms. The results are still consistent with H3b.
Specifically, the coefficient between ∆accuracy and accuracy_change_d is
statistically positive at 1 percent level. This confirms my prediction that followers of
visiting forecast improve more when the visiting forecast is more informative. In
terms of other interaction terms, firm_exp_d is significantly positive, suggesting that
more experienced followers benefit less from the visiting forecast. One plausible
explanation is that more experience analyst trusts more on their information and is
less willing to learn from other’s information. The improvement is also more
pronounced for mature firms, as indicated by the negative coefficient of b2m_d. The
result suggests that the learning effectiveness of the following analysts is higher for
more mature firms. This may be caused by the fact that mature firms are easier to
understand. As a result, following analysts tend to have a greater ability to extract
useful information from the visiting forecasts of the mature firms and incorporate
that information more effectively into their forecasts.

3.4.6. Regressions with self-selection problems mitigated
Analysts are self-selected to become followers. To address the concern that my
results are caused by unobservable characteristics of the followers other than the
information contained in the visiting forecast, this sub-section uses Heckman's
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two-stage method to address the concern of self-selection bias.

3.4.6.1. Sample selection and research design
I use the same sample as in the previous tests for the test in this sub-section. The only
difference is that I use the sample of both followers and non-followers to estimate the
probability of being a follower. The final sample includes 3,018 analyst observations
from 2007 to 2013.

I use the Heckman two-stage sample correction method to address the sample
selection bias. In the first stage, I use the following probit regression to estimate the
probability of issuing a following forecast:

treated = α + β1 accuracy_change + β2 horizon_change + β3 firm_exp +
β4 star_dummy + β5 broker_szie + β6 ana_firm_coverage + β7 Revenue_growth +
β8 loss_dummy + β9 tangibility + β10 manu_dummy + β11 b2m + β12 mkv +
β13 freq_follower + ε

(7)

where treated is a dummy variable that equals to one if the forecast is identified as a
following forecast of visiting forecast, and 0 otherwise. freq_follower measures
analyst’s tendency of being a follower and is a dummy variable that equals to one if
the number of following forecast an analyst issued in that year is larger than or
equals to the mean number of following forecast issued by all analysts. freq_follower
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is associated with the probability of issuing a following forecast but has no obvious
relation to the change in forecast error. This variable is used for identification
purpose. Other control variables are defined in the same way as in the previous
section.

In the second stage, I use the following regression to re-estimate ∆accuracy on
different characteristics by including the inverse mills ratio obtained from the first
stage regression:

∆accuracy = α + β1 follower_visit + β2 accuracy_change + β3 horizon_change +
β4 firm_exp + β5 star_dummy + β6 broker_szie + β7 ana_firm_coverage +
β8 revenue_growth + β9 loss_dummy + β10 tangibility + β11 manu_dummy + β12 b2m +
β13 mkv + β14 lambda + ε

(8)

where lambda is the inverse mills ratio obtained from the first stage regression.

3.4.6.2. Regression analysis
Table 10 reports the regression results for equation 7. The results show that only a
few characteristics have predictive power on the decision of issuing a following
forecast. The coefficient on horizon_change is negative, suggesting that analyst is
more likely to issue a forecast if he has not updated his forecast for a while. With
regards to firm characteristics, analysts are more likely to learn from other’s
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information if the firm has low growth rate, has more tangible assets, operates in the
manufacturing industry, and has larger size. The coefficient on freq_follower is
significantly positive, suggesting that the decision to follow visiting forecast is
related to analysts' timing strategy in issuing a forecast.

Column 2 of Table 11 reports the regression results for equation 8. Compared to the
baseline model in column 1 of Table 11, where I did not correct for the self-selection
bias, the main results still hold. Specifically, the coefficient of accuracy_change is
positive, suggesting that following forecasts improve more when visiting forecast
contain more relevant and accurate information regarding the firm. Similar to the
results in column 1 of Table 11, the learning effect is less pronounced for more
experience analyst. The negative coefficient of star_dummy suggests that star
analysts benefit more from visiting forecast. One plausible explanation is that star
analysts usually have better ability, which helps them to extract and learn from others’
information. The improvement is also more pronounced for mature firms as indicated
by the negative coefficient of b2m.

In sum, the results in this section suggest that following analysts do benefit from the
visiting forecast and the learning effect is more pronounced when visiting forecast
contains a greater amount of useful information regarding the firms' earnings. The
results from Heckman two-stage model suggest that the overall results are unlikely to
be driven by self-selection biases.
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3.5. Information environment
3.5.1. Introduction
In this section, I examine how analyst’s learning activity from visiting forecast
affects the information environment of the visiting firms. I use three measures to
capture the firm-level information environment, namely, analyst forecast dispersion,
common information, and the accuracy of consensus forecast to examine the impact
of learning on the information environment of the visiting firms. If the following
analysts do learn from the visiting forecasts, I expect a decrease in analyst forecast
dispersion, an increase in common information, and an improvement in forecast
accuracy since the following analysts have been simultaneously influenced by the
same visiting forecast that contains useful information.

3.5.2. Hypothesis development
Analyst forecast dispersion has been widely used to measure firm information
environment (Heflin et al., 2003; Byard et al., 2010). Higher forecast dispersion
indicates the existence of a larger disagreement among analyst. If the following
analysts do learn from the visiting forecasts, I expect a decrease in analyst forecast
dispersion since the following analysts simultaneously incorporate the information
contained in the same visiting forecast into their own forecasts. However, if the
followers of non-visiting forecasts had not been influenced systematically by the
non-visiting forecasts, we will not observe the corresponding change in the
non-visiting forecasts.
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Barron et al. (1998) suggest that forecast dispersion of analysts contains both
common and private information. Their model measures the relation between the
properties of analyst’ information environment (uncertainty and information
asymmetry) and forecast properties (dispersion and squared error in the mean
forecast). Specifically, common measures the common information possessed by
analysts and private measures the private information possessed by the analyst.
common and private are estimated using observable properties of analysts’ forecasts:
common

=

𝐷
𝑁

(𝑆𝐸− )
2
1
[(1− )𝐷+𝑆𝐸]
𝑁

,

private =

𝐷
2
1
[(1− )𝐷+𝑆𝐸]
𝑁

where N is the number of analysts’ forecasts. D is the variance of the analysts’
forecasts. SE is the squared error in the mean forecast, computed as the squared
difference between the mean forecasted EPS and actual EPS i.e. (Mean forecasted
EPS – Actual EPS)2.

If following analysts do learn from the same visiting forecasts, I expect to see an
increase in common information in the period subsequent to the visiting forecasts.
However, if the followers of non-visiting forecasts have not been influenced
systematically by the non-visiting forecasts, we cannot observe the corresponding
change in common information in the period subsequent to the issuance of the
non-visiting forecasts.
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Previous studies suggest that more accurate forecasts indicate a firm with a better
information environment. Lang and Lundholm (1996) suggest that firms with better
disclosure quality tend to have lower analyst forecast errors. Hope (2003) shows that
countries with better disclosure policies and enforcement are associated with higher
analyst forecast accuracy. Horton et al. (2013) find that the consensus forecast errors
decrease for firms that mandatorily adopt IFRS relative to forecast errors of other
firms. Similar to the prior literature, I also view an improvement in forecast accuracy
as an indicator of better information environment.

If following analysts do benefit from the visiting forecasts, which contain useful
information, I expect to see an improvement in forecast accuracy in the period
subsequent to the visiting forecasts. However, if the followers of non-visiting
forecasts have not benefited from the non-visiting forecasts, we cannot observe the
corresponding change in forecast accuracy in the period subsequent to the issuance
of the non-visiting forecasts.

Taking the above discussion into consideration, I formulate the following hypotheses
for empirical testing:
H5a: On average, forecast dispersion decreases in the period subsequent to the
issuance of visiting forecast while there is no such change for non-visiting forecasts.
H5b: On average, common information increases in the period subsequent to the
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issuance of visiting forecast while there is no such change for non-visiting forecasts.
H5c: On average, the accuracy of consensus forecast increases in the period
subsequent to the issuance of visiting forecast while there is no such change for
non-visiting forecasts.

3.5.3. Sample selection and research design
Figure 4 depicts the procedure and timeline for identifying the sample for testing H5a,
H5b, and H5c. Similar to the previous sample selection procedures, I first require
visiting analysts to issue a forecast within 30 days after visiting event. To compare
the changes in dispersion and common information for both visiting and non-visiting
forecasts, I form four groups of forecasts, Group 1 refers to forecasts issued within
30 days after analyst i’s visiting forecast, group 2 refers to forecasts issued during 30
days prior to analyst i’s visiting forecast, group 3 refers to forecasts issued within 30
days after analyst i’s prior non-visiting forecast issued during the 6 months prior to
the visiting forecast, and group 4 refers to forecasts issued during 30 days prior to
analyst i’s prior non-visiting forecast issued during the 6 months prior to the visiting
forecast. My final sample include 1,326 firm observations and 361 firm observations
for visiting and non-visiting forecasts respectively for conducting the tests on the
change in dispersion, 1,313 firm observations and 360 firm observations for visiting
and non-visiting forecasts respectively for conducting the test on the change in
common information, and 2,935 firm observations and 490 firm observations for
visiting and non-visiting forecasts respectively for conducting the test on the change
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in forecast accuracy.

To examine the change in forecast dispersion, I compute the change in analyst
forecast dispersion in the periods after and before analyst i’s visiting forecast and
compared that to the change during the similar periods but with regards to analyst i’s
prior non-visiting forecast. Dispersion is defined as the ratio of the standard deviation
of analysts’ current-fiscal-year annual earnings per share forecasts to the absolute
value of the mean forecasts.

In the second test, I use a model developed by Barron et al. (1998) to measure the
change in both common and private information. To test the change in common and
private information shared by analysts, I compute the change in common and private
information in the periods after and before analyst i’s visiting forecast and compared
that to the change during similar periods but with regards to analyst i’s prior
non-visiting forecast.

In the last test, I compute the accuracy of consensus in the periods after and before
analyst i’s visiting forecast and compared that to the change during the similar
periods but with regards to analyst i’s prior non-visiting forecast. The accuracy of
consensus is computed as the absolute forecast error of consensus forecast, scaled by
the stock price at the beginning of the year.
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3.5.4. Empirical results
Table 12 reports the univariate test of the change in forecast dispersion before and
after visiting analysts’ forecasts. The result from Panel A shows that on average,
forecast dispersion decreases in the period subsequent to visiting forecasts and the
results are statistically significant at 1 percent level. On the other hand, the result
from Panel B shows that on average, there is no significant change in forecast
dispersion for visiting analysts’ prior non-visiting forecast. These results confirm the
notion that forecast dispersion decreases after visiting forecast as a result of learning
behavior among analysts.

Table 13 presents the univariate test of the change in common and private
information before and after visiting analysts’ forecasts. The result from Panel A
shows that on average, common information increases after visiting forecast and the
result is statistically significant at 1 percent level. On the other hand, there is no
significant change in private information after visiting forecast. The result from
Panel B shows that on average, there is no significant change in both common and
private information regarding visiting analysts’ prior non-visiting forecasts.

Table 14 shows the univariate test of the change in the accuracy of consensus
forecast before and after visiting analysts’ forecasts. The result from Panel A shows
that on average, the forecast error of consensus forecast decreases after visiting
forecast and the result is statistically significant at 5 percent level. The result from
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Panel B shows that on average, there is no significant change in forecast error of
consensus forecast regarding visiting analysts’ prior non-visiting forecasts.

These results support the notion that following analysts do learn from the same
visiting forecasts and learning among analysts improves the information environment
of corresponding firms.
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Chapter 4. Robustness Tests

4.1. Accuracy relative to consensus forecast
In the main tests, I use the changes in forecast accuracy of the visiting forecasts to
proxy the amount of relevant and accurate information obtained by the visiting
analysts during the corporate visits. Some might argue that other analysts' incentive
to follow/learn from the visiting forecasts might depend not only on the information
obtained by the visiting analysts but also on the availability of the most updated
firm-specific information regarding the visiting firms just before the visiting
forecasts are issued. That is, analysts may continuously learn from all analysts. To
the extent that some information obtained by the visiting analysts have somehow
been diffused to other analysts and those analysts have made use of the information
to issue forecast before the visiting analysts, the new information contained in the
visiting analysts in the eyes of other analysts may not be accurately proxied by the
change in accuracy of the visiting forecast relative to non-visiting forecasts. Under
that circumstance, the amount of new information may be more properly proxied by
the change in accuracy of the visiting forecasts concerning the consensus forecasts
immediately before the issuance of the visiting forecasts.

I conduct a robustness test to examine whether my results are robust to different
measures of the information contained in the visiting forecasts. To do this, I first
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examine whether the forecast accuracy of the visiting forecasts is higher than that of
the prior consensus forecasts.

Similarly to my previous sample selection procedures, I combine site visit happened
on adjacent dates as one event and end up with 20,811 firm-level site visit
observations. Furthermore, visiting forecasts are identified as the forecasts issued by
visiting analysts within 30 days after site visit event because such focus could ensure
that visiting analyst’s forecast reveals the information observed from the visiting
event. This step reduces the sample to 6,993 visiting forecast observations. I only
keep the first visiting forecast if the site visit is conducted by multiple analysts and
end up with 5,791 visiting forecasts observations. I further require there is at least
one forecast in the month prior to the visiting forecast in order to compute the
consensus forecast. My final sample consists a total of 3,832 visiting forecast
observations.

I use the univariate test to examine the difference in forecast accuracy between
visiting forecasts and prior consensus forecasts. Specifically, I compare the absolute
forecast error of these two groups of forecasts. The prior consensus forecast is
defined as the mean EPS forecast in the month prior to the visiting forecast.
consensus_fe is computed as the absolute difference between the consensus EPS
forecast and actual EPS, scaled by the stock price at
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the beginning of the year.

visiting_fe is computed as the absolute difference between the visiting EPS forecast
and actual EPS, scaled by the stock price at the beginning of the year.

Table 15 reports the univariate test of the difference in forecast error between the
visiting forecast and the prior consensus forecast. As shown in the table, the mean
absolute forecast error of the visiting forecast is 0.0093 while the mean absolute
forecast error of the prior consensus forecast is 0.0101. The results confirm that on
average, the visiting forecast has higher accuracy than the prior consensus forecast
and the difference is statistically significant at 1 percent level.

I use the new variable of accuracy_change (relative to consensus), defined as the
difference inaccuracy between the visiting forecasts and the consensus forecasts, to
replace my previous variable of accuracy_change, and re-estimate Equations 1 to 6. I
find qualitative consistent results for all the regressions, though the coefficients for
Equations 1 and 2 are statistically insignificant. The lack of significance may due to
the offsetting effects regarding the number of followers. It may also indicate the
sensitivity of our previous results to different information measures. Caution should
be therefore exercised when we conclude the relation between the change in the
number of followers and the information contained in the visiting forecasts. To save
space, I do not report the results of the regressions using the new variable.
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4.2. Earnings announcement period
Prior studies have examined analysts’ behavior after earnings announcement
(Clement et al., 2010; Schrand et al., 2014). The key premise of their studies is that
earnings announcement serves as an information shock for analysts. In other words,
the availability of new information of the firm helps mitigate the information gap
among different analysts. Therefore, one could argue that if the visiting forecast is
issued after earnings announcement, the results in the main tests could be caused by
the common information shock (i.e., earnings announcement) rather than the learning
activity.

To address this concern, I conduct a robustness test to examine whether the main
results are robust without the confounding effect of earnings announcement.
Specifically, I exclude the sample that might be affected by the earnings
announcement. To be consistent with the main tests, visiting forecasts are identified
as the forecasts issued by visiting analysts within 30 days after site visit event
because such focus could ensure that visiting analyst’s forecast reveals the
information observed from the visiting event. The visiting forecast will be excluded
if it is issued within 30 days after either a quarterly or annual earnings announcement
date. I then use the new sample to re-estimate all the tests in the main sections.

Generally, the results are qualitative consistent to the main results. For the test of the
change in number of followers, the number of followers of visiting forecast is higher
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than the number of followers of non-visiting forecast (untabulated) and the result is
statistically significant at 1 percent level. In terms of the regression results, although
the sign of the coefficients of accuracy_change remains positive, it is only
marginally significant in equation 2 but not in equation 1.

For the test of the influence of visiting forecasts on following forecast, the results are
similar to the findings in the main tests. The mean of gap_closed is 0.5031
(untabulated), which is comparable to the results from the main tests (0.5588), and is
statistically significant at 1 percent level. The regression analysis also yields a
statistically negative coefficient of accuracy_change (untabulated), implying that
following forecasts move closer towards visiting forecast when the visiting forecast
contains more accurate and relevant information.

For the test of the accuracy change of followers and non-followers, the results are
also consistent. The univariate test shows that followers of visiting forecasts tend to
improve more in forecast accuracy compared to non-followers of visiting forecasts.
The difference in the improvement of forecast accuracy is statistically significant at 1
percent level (untabulated). The regression results also show that the coefficient of
accuracy_change is still significantly negative for both equation 5 and 6
(untabulated), indicating that the improvement in forecast accuracy is more
pronounced for followers.
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For the test of information environment change regarding visiting forecast, main
results still hold. Common information increases in the period subsequent to the
issuance of visiting forecasts and the result is statistically significant at 10 percent
level (untabulated). On the other hand, there is no statistically significant change in
common information regarding the non-visiting forecasts. The consensus forecast
also improves in forecast accuracy in the period subsequent to the issuance of
visiting forecasts and the result is statistically significant at 5 percent level
(untabulated). There is no significant change in forecast accuracy regarding the
non-visiting forecasts. The dispersion of analyst forecast becomes insignificant for
both visiting and non-visiting forecasts. Since the sample size is relative small (618
observations for visiting forecast and 168 observations for non-visiting forecast), the
results are quite sensitive and should be interpreted with cautious.
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4.3. Alternative windows in identifying following forecasts
In the main tests, I use 30 days as the cut-off point to identify the following forecasts
of the visiting forecasts. In this section, I use two different alternative windows, 20
and 40 days, and re-estimate the main regressions.

I employ the same sample selection procedures except that following forecasts are
now identified as the forecasts issued by non-visiting analysts within 20 and 40 days
after the issuance of visiting forecasts. Other variables are defined in the same way as
in the main tests.

Generally, the results are similar. For the test of the change in number of followers,
the number of followers of visiting forecast is higher than the number of followers of
non-visiting forecast (untabulated) under both 20 and 40 days windows. The results
are all statistically significant at 1 percent level. In terms of the regression results, the
coefficients of variable accuracy_change remain positive and are significant at 5
percent level.

For the test of the influence of visiting forecasts on following forecast, the results are
also similar. The mean of gap_closed is 0.54 (untabulated) and 0.51 (untabulated)
under 20 days and 40 days windows and are both larger compared to the non-visiting
forecasts. The regression analysis also yields statistically negative coefficients of
variable accuracy_change (untabulated) under both windows.
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For the test of the accuracy change of followers and non-followers, the results are
also consistent. The univariate test shows that followers of visiting forecasts tend to
improve more in forecast accuracy compared to non-followers of visiting forecasts
under both 20 and 40 days windows. The differences in the improvement of forecast
accuracy are all statistically significant at 1 percent level (untabulated). The
regression results also show that the coefficients of variable accuracy_change remain
significantly negative for both equation 5 and 6 (untabulated).

For the test of information environment change regarding visiting forecast, main
results still hold. I still find a decrease in forecast dispersion, an increase in common
information, and an improvement in the accuracy of consensus forecast in the period
subsequent to the issuance of visiting forecasts under both windows.
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Chapter 5. Conclusion, Limitations and Avenues for Future Research

To summarize, I find that the visiting forecasts tend to attract more following
forecasts than non-visiting forecasts do by comparing the number of followers
between visiting and non-visiting forecast. The following effect is also weaker when
the visiting forecasts are more informative. Also, by examining the inter-influence
among analysts, I find that the following forecasts tend to move closer to the visiting
forecasts than the prior following forecasts do, with the influences of the visiting
forecasts being stronger for more informative visiting forecasts. Furthermore, by
comparing the forecast accuracy change of followers and non-followers of visiting
forecast, I demonstrate that followers of the visiting forecasts experience a greater
improvement in their forecast accuracy than non-followers. This effect is also
stronger when the visiting forecasts are more informative. Last but not the least, I
find a decline in the analyst forecast dispersion and an increase in common
information in the period subsequent to the visiting analysts’ forecasts but no such
effect for the non-visiting forecasts. Collectively, the results suggest that analysts
have the incentive to learn from the forecasts that contain superior private
information and such learning activities tend to improve the information environment
of the visiting firms.

My study also suffers from several limitations. Firstly, it is extremely difficult to
study the exact cognitive process of analysts. My study only focuses on the earnings
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forecast of an analyst -- the outcome of learning activities. However, it is very
difficult to show how and why an analyst really make a forecasting decision and
come up with such a forecast. Further studies revealing the decision process of
analyst could further extend our understanding of how analysts actually learn from
different information sources. Secondly, the sample size in my study is limited
because of the data availability. I plan to collect the data of site visit and extend the
sample period in my future work. Although the short window employed in my study
can mitigate concerns arising from structural changes in the Chinese stock market, I
also plan to use propensity score matching to find a control sample without site visit
and visiting forecast when more observations are available. This can allow me to
conduct a more rigorous difference-in-difference analysis, which can further filter
out the time-varying changes that occur to both treated and control groups.

In addition to the above future research areas, I may also try to investigate how the
content of site visit and the visiting forecast may influence the learning process.
Studying how analysts learn from the content of site visit will enhance our
understanding on the learning process of analysts. My current study focuses on firms
listed on SZSE. The firms are usually smaller in size and operate in high technology
industries than those listed on SHSE. If data from firms listed on SHSE becomes
available in the future, re-examining my research questions using the data from
SHSE could further enhance our understanding of how learning behaviors of
financial analysts are affected by firm characteristics. Lastly, I could also identify
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other factors (such as corporate transparency, geographic distance, and market
sentiment) that may influence learning process.
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Appendix A
Site visit example: Extract from the 2008 annual report of Nanning Sugar Industry Co., Ltd
During the reporting period, the company conducted investor activities for a total of 13 times and communicated with 23 different investor bodies.
Secretary of the board, chief treasurer, senior management staff and corresponding departments participated in the events. Since investors
participated in such events are more likely to discover non-public information and then disseminate and profit from such information than
individual investor, the company strictly follows the information disclosure guidelines issued by the SZSE and avoids any discrimination
between investors. The company ensures that no selective disclosure has happened during any investor activity event and guarantees the fairness
of information disclosure. The details of investor activities are as follow.
Date

Place

Format*

Investor**

15-Feb-08

Headquarter

Site visit

Hua An Fund Management

Headquarter

Site visit

Rongtong Fund Management

Headquarter

Site visit

Everbright Securities

Headquarter

Site visit

Fortune Sg Fund Management

Headquarter

Site visit

China Asset Management

Headquarter

Site visit

Haitong Securities

Telephone
interviews
Telephone
interviews

China Universal Asset
Management
China Post & Capital Fund
Management

19-Feb-08

24-Mar-08
7-May-08

Topics discussed and materials provided
How sugarcanes' production was affected by the extreme cold weather;
its influence on sugar production in the coming season
How sugarcanes' production was affected by the extreme cold weather;
its influence on sugar production in the coming season
How sugarcanes' production was affected by the extreme cold weather;
its influence on sugar production in the coming season
How sugarcanes' production was affected by the extreme cold weather;
its influence on sugar production in the coming season
How sugarcanes' production was affected by the extreme cold weather;
its influence on sugar production in the coming season
Operation performance since 2008; sugarcane production
Business operation; future plans
Business operation; future plans
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8-May-08

Headquarter

Site visit

China Great Wall Securities

Business operation; future plans

28-May-08

Headquarter

Site visit

Shenzhen Runge Pioneer
Invest Management

Business operation; future plans

21-Aug-08

Headquarter

Site visit

Sinolink Secutities

Business operation; future plans

GF Securities

Business operation; future plans

1-Sep-08

Headquarter

Site visit

Haitong Securities

Business operation; future plans

30-Oct-08

Headquarter

Site visit

Goldman Sachs (Asia)

Business operation; future plans

Headquarter

Site visit

The Cathay Investment Fund

Business operation; future plans

Headquarter

Site visit

Schroders Investment
Management (HK)

Business operation; future plans

Headquarter

Site visit

Libra Capital Management

Business operation; future plans

Headquarter

Site visit

Amundi Asset Management

Business operation; future plans

Headquarter

Site visit

11-Nov-08

Headquarter

Site visit

17-Dec-08

Headquarter

Site visit

Highbridge Capital
Management
ICBC Credit Suisse Asset
Management
Essence Securities

Business operation; future plans
Business operation; future plans
Business operation; future plans

*Site visits accounts for the majority of communication event between company and investors. Other communication events include telephone
interviews, performance illustration webinars, email exchanges, investor conferences, industry forums, and annual broker conferences
**There are also some other investor bodies like banks, insurance company, media, and individual investor
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Appendix B
Numeric example for sample and variable construction in Chapter 2
This appendix presents a hypothetic numeric example to illustrate how the sample is
constructed when examining analyst influence.

Analyst
Forecast by analyst j’s
Visiting forecast by analyst i
Forecast by analyst j

Date
5/5/2009
1/6/2009
15/6/2009

EPS
$0.8
$1.15
$1.05

Considered a hypothetic case that analyst i issued an EPS forecast of $1.15 on June 1,
2009 after site visit. Analyst j revises his EPS forecast on June 15 from $0.8 (May 5,
2009) to 1.05.
Gap = $1.15 – $0.8 = +$0.35 (the difference between the first two forecast)
Revision = $1.05 – $0.8 = +$0.25 (the difference between the first and third forecast)
Gap closed = Revision / Gap = $0.25 / $0.35 = +$0.71
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Figure 1. Timeline for identifying following forecasts and the number of followers
The number of follower for visiting forecast is computed as the number of analysts who issued forecast within 30 days after the issuance of the
visiting forecast. Non-visiting forecast is identified as the visiting analyst’s most recent forecast regarding the same firm during the 6 months
prior to the visiting forecast. The number of follower for non-visiting forecast is then computed in the same way.

Analyst i’s non-visiting forecast

T - 180

t

Analyst i’s visiting forecast

t + 30

Number of followers for non-visiting forecast

T

T + 30

Number of followers for visiting forecast
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Figure 2. Timeline for identifying following forecasts of visiting and non-visiting forecasts
Following forecasts are identified as the forecasts issued within 30 days after the issuance of the visiting forecast. I further require the follower to
issue a forecast during the 6 months prior to the following forecast in order to compute revision. Non-visiting forecast is identified as the visiting
analyst’s most recent forecast regarding the same firm during the 6 months prior to the visiting forecast. Revisions and prior forecasts are
identified in the same way.

Analyst i’s non-visiting forecast

Analyst i’s visiting forecast

T + 30

T

T - 180
Analyst j’s prior forecast

Analyst j’s following forecast
of visiting forecast
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Figure 3. Timeline for identifying the accuracy change of following forecasts of visiting and non-visiting forecasts
Following forecasts of the visiting forecasts are identified as the forecasts issued within 30 days after the issuance of the visiting forecast.
Following forecasts of the non-visiting forecasts are identified as the forecasts issued during 30 days before the issuance of the visiting forecasts.
I further require followers of the visiting forecasts and followers of the non-visiting forecasts to issue at least one forecast regarding the same
firm during 6 months prior to the current following forecast.

Analyst i’s visiting forecast

T - 30

T - 180

Analyst X’s prior forecast

T

T + 30

Analyst X’s non-following forecast
of visiting forecast (non-follower)
Analyst Y’s following forecast of visiting forecast
(follower)

Analyst Y’s prior forecast
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Figure 4. Timeline for identifying the sample in firm level information environment analysis
The sample includes four groups of forecasts:
(1) forecasts issued within 30 days after analyst i’s visiting forecast
(2) forecasts issued during 30 days prior to analyst i’s visiting forecast
(3) forecasts issued within 30 days after analyst i’s non-visiting forecast
(4) forecasts issued during 30 days prior to analyst i’s non-visiting forecast
Non-visiting forecast is identified as visiting analyst’s most recent forecast during 6 months prior to the visiting forecast.

Analyst i’s non-visiting forecast

T - 180

t-30

t+30

t
(4)

Analyst i’s visiting forecast

T - 30
(2)

(3)
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T + 30

T
(1)

Table 1: Sample selection – Site visit
This table shows the sample section procedure for my sample of site visit events
conducted by brokerage firms during 2007 to 2013

No. Observations
1. All investor activities records

85,476

2. Requiring site visits events conducted by sell-side
analysts

43,849

3. Combining same day site visit events as one event

25,256

4. Dropping observations with missing values for
variables

20,811
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Table 2: Sample selection – Followers of visiting and non-visiting forecast
This table shows the sample section procedure for my sample of site visit events
conducted by brokerage firms during 2007 to 2013

No. Observations
1. Site visit observations

20,811

2. Requiring following analysts to issue a forecast
within 30 days after site visit

6,993

3. Keep the first visiting forecast if the site visit is
conducted by multiple analysts

5,791

4. Requiring visiting analysts to issue at least one
forecast during the 6 months prior to the visiting
forecasts

1,490
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics on followers of visiting and non-visiting forecasts
This table reports descriptive statistics for 1,490 visiting analyst observations from
2007 to 2013. I restrict the sample to visiting analysts’ forecasts issued within 30
days after the visiting event. The number of follower for visiting forecast is then
computed as the number of analysts who issued forecast within 30 days after the
issuance of the visiting forecast. Non-visiting forecast is identified as the visiting
analyst’s most recent forecast regarding the same firm during the 6 months prior to
the visiting forecast. The number of follower for non-visiting forecast is then
computed in the same way. ln_change measures the change in the number of
followers for visiting analysts and is computed as the log transformation of one plus
the number of followers for the visiting forecast minus the log transformation of one
plus the number of followers for the non-visiting forecast. d_change is another
measure of the change in the number of followers for visiting analysts and is a
dummy variable that equals to 1 if the number of followers for the visiting forecast is
larger than the number of followers for the non-visiting forecast and equals to 0
otherwise. accuracy_change measures the informativeness of the visiting forecast
and is computed as the absolute value of forecast error of the visiting forecast minus
the forecast error of the non-visiting forecast, scaled by the stock price at the
beginning of the year. firm_exp measures analyst’s firm specific experience and is
computed as the number of years between an analyst’s first forecast for firm i and
his/her current forecast for firm i. star_dummy is a dummy variable that equals to one
if the analyst is ranked as the star analyst by the New Fortune magazine in the
previous year. broker_size measures the size of the brokerage firm and is computed
as the number of analysts working for the brokers. ana_firm_coverage is computed
as the number of firms analyst is assigned to follow. revenue_growth measures the
revenue growth of the firm and is computed as the revenue in year t divided by the
revenue in year t-1. loss_dummy is a dummy variable that equals to one if the net
income is negative in year t, and 0 otherwise. tangibility measures the tangibility of
the firm and is computed as the ratio of PP&E over total assets. manu_dummy is a
dummy variable that equals to one if the firm is a manufacturing firm, and 0
otherwise. b2m is the book-to-market ratio and is computed as the book value of
equity divided by the market value of equity. mkv is the firm size and is computed as
the log transformation of the market value of equity of firm. The t-statistics
computed are reported in parentheses. In Panel A, *** denotes significance at the
0.01 level.
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Table 3 (Cont’d)
Panel A: The number of follower for visiting and non-visiting forecast
Variables
Obs

Mean

Number of follower for visiting forecast
Number of follower for non-visiting forecast

1490
1490

2.4389
1.5134

Visiting – Non-visiting

1490

0.9255***
(9.73)

Panel B: Variables for analyses
Variables

Obs

Mean

Median

S.D.

Min

Max

d_change

1490

0.5128

1

0.5000

0

1

ln_change

1490

0.3165

0.2877

0.9440

-2.8332

2.8904

accuracy_change

1490

0.0011

0

0.0200

-0.0898

0.3951

firm_exp

1490

1.8114

1

1.156059

1

9

star_dummy

1490

0.1940

0

0.3955

0

1

broker_size

1490

44.4409

42

21.6256

2

105

ana_firm_coverage

1490

23.2161

17

21.5861

1

179

revenue_growth

1289

12.9189

1.2368

414.5362

0.2411

14884.06

loss_dummy

1490

0.0107

0

0.1031

0

1

tangibility

1490

0.2069

0.1628

0.1603

0.0006

0.8494

manu_dummy

1490

0.6

1

0.4901

0

1

b2m

1490

0.2989

0.2317

0.2620

-0.0181

2.1923

mkv

1490

15.7132 15.5655

0.9958

13.3421

18.6942
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Table 4: The change in the number of followers for visiting analysts
This table presents the OLS regression results of the change in the number of
followers for visiting analysts on analyst and firm characteristics. The t-statistics
computed are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%,
5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
ln_change = α + β1 accuracy_change + β2 firm_exp + β3 star_dummy + β4 broker_szie +
β4 ana_firm_coverage + β5 Revenue_growth + β6 loss_dummy + β7 tangibility +
β8 manu_dummy + β9 b2m + β10 mkv + ε
(1)

d_change = α + β1 accuracy_change + β2 firm_exp + β3 star_dummy + β4 broker_szie +
β4 ana_firm_coverage + β5 Revenue_growth + β6 loss_dummy + β7 tangibility +
β8 manu_dummy + β9 b2m + β10 mkv + ε
(2)
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Table 4 (Cont’d)
Variables

accuracy_change
firm_exp
star_dummy
broker_size
ana_firm_coverage
revenue_growth
loss_dummy
tangibility
manu_dummy
b2m
mkv
constant
Industry fixed effect
Year fixed effect
Observations
Adj. R2
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ln_change
(1)

d_change
(2)

2.6394**
(1.97)
0.0652***
(2.66)
0.0295
(0.41)
0.0003
(0.20)
0.0003
(0.26)
-0.0001
(-1.54)
0.1109
(0.43)
-0.1468
(-0.72)
0.2141
(0.93)
-0.1734
(-1.41)
-0.0386
(-1.20)
0.8405
(1.39)
Yes
Yes

2.2855***
(3.23)
0.0116
(0.89)
0.0321
(0.84)
0.0005
(0.69)
0.0003
(0.40)
-0.0000
(-1.04)
-0.0846
(-0.61)
0.0525
(0.48)
0.1409
(1.15)
-0.1526**
(-2.34)
0.0184
(1.08)
0.1584
(0.49)
Yes
Yes

1,271
0.012

1,271
0.013

Table 5: Descriptive statistics on the influence of visiting forecasts on following
forecasts
This table reports descriptive statistics for 1,526 visiting analyst observations from
2007 to 2013. I restrict the sample to visiting analysts’ forecasts issued within 30
days after the visiting event. Following forecasts are identified as the forecasts issued
within 30 days after the issuance of the visiting forecast. I further require the
follower to issue a forecast during the 6 months prior to the following forecast.
Non-visiting forecast is identified as the visiting analyst’s most recent forecast
regarding the same firm during the 6 months prior to the visiting forecast. Following
forecasts are identified in the same way. Gap is defined as the difference between the
visiting analyst’s forecast and the followers’ prior forecast. Revision is defined as the
difference between following analyst’s forecast and his/her most recent prior forecast.
gap_closed is defined as Revision/Gap, and is winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels.
accuracy_change measures the informativeness of the visiting forecast and is
computed as the absolute value of forecast error of the visiting forecast minus the
forecast error of the non-visiting forecast, scaled by the stock price at the beginning
of the year. horizon_change measures the difference in forecasting horizon and is
computed as the log transformation of the difference in following analyst’s two
forecasts. firm_exp measures analyst’s firm specific experience and is computed as
the number of years between an analyst’s first forecast for firm i and his/her current
forecast for firm i. star_dummy is a dummy variable that equals to one if the analyst
is ranked as the star analyst by the New Fortune magazine in the previous year.
broker_size measures the size of the brokerage firm and is computed as the number
of analysts working for the brokers. ana_firm_coverage is computed as the number
of firms analyst is assigned to follow. revenue_growth measures the revenue growth
of the firm and is computed as the revenue in year t divided by the revenue in year
t-1. loss_dummy is a dummy variable that equals to one if the net income is negative
in year t, and 0 otherwise. tangibility measures the tangibility of the firm and is
computed as the ratio of PP&E over total assets. manu_dummy is a dummy variable
that equals to one if the firm is a manufacturing firm, and 0 otherwise. b2m is the
book-to-market ratio and is computed as the book value of equity divided by the
market value of equity. mkv is the firm size and is computed as the log
transformation of the market value of equity of firm. The t-statistics computed are
reported in parentheses. In Panel A, *** denotes significance at the 0.01 level.
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Table 5 (Cont’d)

Panel A: The influence of visiting analyst
Variables

Obs

Mean

gap_closed (visiting forecast)

1526

0.5588***
(9.19)

gap_closed (non-visiting forecast)

538

0.3319**
(1.93)

Panel B: Variables for analyses
Variables

Obs

Mean

Median

S.D.

Min

Max

gap_closed

1526

0.5588

0.3333

2.0035

-11.0000

11.0000

accuracy_change

1526

-0.0023

0

0.0058

-0.0341

0.0197

horizon_change

1526

-0.6339

-0.4413

0.5793

-4.1431

-0.0473

firm_exp

1526

1.9561

2

1.2850

1

9

star_dummy

1526

0.2195

0

0.4141

0

1

broker_size

1526

46.8198

44

20.7944

6

105

ana_firm_coverage

1526

22.5741

17

20.7424

1

179

revenue_growthh

1348

1.3013

1.2435

0.4334

0.4823

7.4592

loss_dummy

1526

0.0079

0

0.0884

0

1

tangibility

1526

0.1968

0.1712296

0.1426

0.0008

0.7722

manu_dummy

1526

0.5682

1

0.4955

0

1

b2m

1526

0.2531

0.2085

0.2050

-0.018

1.978

mkv

1526

16.1281

15.9903

1.0676

13.6690

18.6942
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Table 6: The influence of visiting forecasts on following forecasts
This table presents the OLS regression results of the influence of vising forecasts.
The dependent variable is gap_closed, which is defined in Table 3. interval is defined
as the difference between the date of the visiting analyst’s forecast and the date of the
following analyst’s forecast. interval2 is the squared term of interval while interval3
is the quadratic term of interval. The t-statistics computed are reported in parentheses.
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
gap_closed = α + β1 interval + β2 interval2 + β3 interval3 + ε

interval
interval2
interval3
constant
Observations
Adj. R2

Without the influence of visiting
forecast
(1)
(2)
-0.0126
0.0051
(-0.72)
(0.03)
0.0006
(0.04)
-0.0000
(-0.15)
0.4600*
0.3836
(1.88)
(0.99)
538
538
-0.001
-0.004
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With the influence of visiting
forecast
(3)
(4)
-0.0110
0.0541
(-1.61)
(0.82)
-0.0058
(-1.04)
0.0001
(1.04)
0.6602***
0.5417***
(6.29)
(3.12)
1,526
1,526
0.001
0.000

Table 7: The influence of characteristics of visiting analysts on following
forecasts
This table presents the OLS regression results of the influence of vising forecasts on
visiting analyst and firm characteristics. The t-statistics computed are reported in
parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels,
respectively.
gap_closed = α + β1 accuracy_change + β2 horizon_change + β3 firm_exp +
β4 star_dummy + β5 broker_szie + β6 ana_firm_coverage + β7 Revenue_growth +
β8 loss_dummy + β9 tangibility + β10 manu_dummy + β11 b2m + β12 mkv + ε
Variables
accuracy_change

(1)
-0.2170**
(-2.46)

0.4566***
(8.29)
No
No

(2)
-0.2396**
(-2.42)
-0.0936
(-0.95)
-0.0001
(-0.00)
-0.0110
(-0.07)
0.0063**
(2.13)
0.0038
(1.35)
-0.0065
(-0.05)
0.2116
(0.31)
0.0279
(0.06)
-0.9977
(-1.61)
-0.2888
(-0.89)
0.0825
(1.32)
0.5128
(0.39)
Yes
Yes

1,526
0.003

1,344
0.023

horizon_change
firm_exp
star_dummy
broker_size
ana_firm_coverage
revenue_growth
loss_dummy
tangibility
manu_dummy
b2m
mkv
constant
Industry fixed effect
Year fixed effect
observations
Adj. R2
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Table 8: Descriptive statistics on accuracy change of followers and non-followers
This table reports descriptive statistics for 3,483 analyst observations from 2007 to
2013. I restrict the sample to visiting analysts’ forecasts issued within 30 days after
the visiting event. Following forecasts of the visiting forecasts are identified as the
forecasts issued within 30 days after the issuance of the visiting forecast. Following
forecasts of the non-visiting forecasts are identified as the forecasts issued during 30
days before the issuance of the visiting forecasts. I further require followers of the
visiting forecasts and followers of the non-visiting forecasts to issue at least one
forecast regarding the same firm during 6 months prior to the current following
forecast. ∆accuracy measures the change in forecast error and is computed as the
absolute difference between forecast error of analyst i and his forecast during 6
months prior to the current forecast, scaled by the stock price at the beginning of the
year for a given firm and fiscal year. follower_visit is a dummy variable that equals
to on is the forecast is identified as a following forecast of visiting forecast, and 0
otherwise. accuracy_change measures the informativeness of the visiting forecast
and is computed as the absolute value of forecast error of the visiting forecast minus
the forecast error of the non-visiting forecast, scaled by the stock price at the
beginning of the year. horizon_change measures the difference in forecasting horizon
and is computed as the log transformation of the difference in analyst i ’s two
forecasts. firm_exp measures analyst’s firm specific experience and is computed as
the number of years between an analyst’s first forecast for firm i and his/her current
forecast for firm i. star_dummy is a dummy variable that equals to one if the analyst
is ranked as the star analyst by the New Fortune magazine in the previous year.
broker_size measures the size of the brokerage firm and is computed as the number
of analysts working for the brokers. ana_firm_coverage is computed as the number
of firms analyst is assigned to follow. revenue_growth measures the revenue growth
of the firm and is computed as the revenue in year t divided by the revenue in year
t-1. loss_dummy is a dummy variable that equals to one if the net income is negative
in year t, and 0 otherwise. tangibility measures the tangibility of the firm and is
computed as the ratio of PP&E over total assets. manu_dummy is a dummy variable
that equals to one if the firm is a manufacturing firm, and 0 otherwise. b2m is the
book-to-market ratio and is computed as the book value of equity divided by the
market value of equity. mkv is the firm size and is computed as the log
transformation of the market value of equity of firm. accuracy_change_d is the
interaction term of error_change and follower_visit. firm_exp_d is the interaction
term of firm_exp and follower_visit. star_dummy_d is the interaction term of
star_dummy and follower_visit. broker_size_d is the interaction term of broker_size
and follower_visit. ana_firm_coverage is the interaction term of ana_firm_coverage
and follower_visit. revenue_growth_d is the interaction term of revenue_growth and
follower_visit. loss_d is the interaction term of loss_dummy and follower_visit.
tangibility_d is the interaction term of tangibility and follower_visit. manu_d is the
interaction term of manu_dummy and follower_visit. b2m_d is the interaction term of
b2m and follower_visit. mkv_d is the interaction term of mkv and follower_visit. The
81

t-statistics computed are reported in parentheses. In Panel A, *** denotes
significance at the 0.01 level
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Table 8 (Cont’d)

Panel A: The change in forecast error of following and non –following forecasts
Variables
Obs
Prior forecast

Current forecast

Difference

(2)
0.0056

(1) - (2)
0.0014***
(14.92)
0.0031***
(15.91)

Non-following forecast of visiting forecast

2261

(1)
0.0069

Following forecast of visiting forecast

1222

0.0078

0.0047

-0.0009***
(-3.01)

0.0008***
(3.79)

Non-following - Following

83

-0.0017***
(-9.03)

Table 8 (Cont’d)
Panel B: Variables for analyses
Variables

Obs

Mean

Median

S.D.

Min

Max

∆accuracy

3483

-0.0197

0

0.0540

-0.3254

0.2102

follower_visit

3483

0.3508

0

0.4773

0

1

accuracy_change

3483

-0.0018

0

0.0057

-0.0341

0.0212

horizon_change

3483

-0.3613

-0.2814

0.4954

-4.1431

0

firm_exp

3483

1.8803

1

1.2149

1

9

star_dummy

3483

0.1539

0

0.3609

0

1

broker_size

3483

41.7962

39

21.3897

2

105

ana_firm_coverage

3483

22.10

17

21.94

1

252

revenue_growth

3036

6.2070

1.2454

270.1051

0.2411

14884.0600

loss_dummy

3483

0.0043

0

0.0655

0

1

tangibility

3483

0.2017

0.1699

0.1492

0.0006

0.7722

manu_dummy

3483

0.5848

1

0.4928

0

1

b2m

3483

0.2643

0.2120

0.2130

-0.0181

1.9782

mkv

3483

16.0492

15.9011

1.0723

13.9130

18.6942
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Table 9: Forecast accuracy change and characteristics
This table presents the OLS regression results of the change in forecast accuracy on
followers of visiting forecast indicator and forecast, analyst, and firm characteristics.
The t-statistics computed are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
∆accuracy = α + β1 follower_visit + β2 accuracy_change + β3 horizon_change +
β4 firm_exp + β5 star_dummy + β6 broker_szie + β7 ana_firm_coverage +
β8 revenue_growth + β9 loss_dummy + β10 tangibility + β11 manu_dummy + β12 b2m +
β13 mkv + ε
(1)

∆accuracy = α + β1 follower_visit + β2 accuracy_change_d + β3 firm_exp_d +
β4 star_dummy_d + β5 broker_szie_d + β6 ana_firm_coverage_d +
β7 revenue_growth_d + β8 loss_dummy_d + β9 tangibility_d + β10 manu_dummy_d +
β11 b2m_d + β12 mkv_d + 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + ε
(3)
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Table 9 (Cont’d)
Variables
follower_visit

(1)

(2)

(3)

-0.0110***
(-5.25)

-0.0055**
(-2.57)
2.9555***
(9.73)

0.0401**
(2.01)
Yes
Yes
Yes

0.0338*
(1.72)
Yes
Yes
Yes

-0.0081
(-0.27)
2.8020***
(9.19)
0.0044***
(2.89)
-0.0071
(-1.35)
-0.0001
(-0.73)
-0.0001
(-1.53)
-0.0037
(-0.70)
-0.0374
(-1.43)
0.0089
(0.70)
-0.0058
(-1.51)
-0.0425***
(-4.38)
0.0011
(0.64)
0.0416*
(1.82)
Yes
Yes
Yes

3,018
0.208

3,018
0.232

3,018
0.241

accuracy_change_d
firm_exp_d
star_dummy_d
broker_size_d
ana_firm_coverage_d
revenue_growth_d
loss_d
tangibility_d
manu_d
b2m_d
mkv_d
constant
controls
Industry fixed effect
Year fixed effect
observations
Adj. R2
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Table 10: Probit estimate of the probability of issuing a following forecast
This table presents the probit estimate of the probability of being a follower on
different forecast, analyst, and firm characteristics. treated is a dummy variable that
equals to one if the forecast is identified as a following forecast of visiting forecast,
and 0 otherwise. freq_follower is a dummy variable that equals to one if the number
of following forecast an analyst issued in that year is larger than or equals to the
mean number of following forecast issued by all analysts. Other variables are defined
in the same way as above. The t-statistics computed are reported in parentheses. ***,
**, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.

treated = α + β1 accuracy_change + β2 horizon_change + β3 firm_exp +
β4 star_dummy + β5 broker_szie + β6 ana_firm_coverage + β7 Revenue_growth +
β8 loss_dummy + β9 tangibility + β10 manu_dummy + β11 b2m + β12 mkv +
β13 freq_follower + ε
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Table 10 (cont’d)
Coeff.
(t-value)
0.5034
(0.11)
-1.9723***
(-23.58)
0.0199
(0.86)
-0.0648
(-0.83)
0.0020
(1.41)
-0.0017
(-1.27)
-0.3725***
(-3.90)
0.4376
(1.06)
0.5575**
(2.51)
0.6133**
(2.06)
-0.2744*
(-1.71)
0.0521*
(1.76)
0.3963***
(6.78)
-2.5431***
(-3.97)
Yes
Yes

Variables
accuracy_change
horizon_change
firm_exp
star_dummy
broker_size
ana_firm_coverage
revenue_growth
loss_dummy
tangibility
manu_dummy
b2m
mkv
freq_follower
constant
Industry fixed effect
Year fixed effect
observations
Adj. R2

3,018
0.254
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Table 11: Regression after sample selection correction
This table presents OLS regression results of the change in forecast accuracy on
different forecast, analyst, and firm characteristics. lambda is the inverse mills ratio
from Table 5. Other variables are defined in the same way as above. The t-statistics
computed are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%,
5%, and 10% levels, respectively.

∆accuracy = α + β1 follower_visit + β2 accuracy_change + β3 horizon_change +
β4 firm_exp + β5 star_dummy + β6 broker_szie + β7 ana_firm_coverage +
β8 revenue_growth + β9 loss_dummy + β10 tangibility + β11 manu_dummy + β12 b2m +
β13 mkv + ε
(1)

∆accuracy = α + β1 follower_visit + β2 accuracy_change + β3 horizon_change +
β4 firm_exp + β5 star_dummy + β6 broker_szie + β7 ana_firm_coverage +
β8 revenue_growth + β9 loss_dummy + β10 tangibility + β11 manu_dummy + β12 b2m +
β13 mkv + β14 lambda + ε
(2)
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Table 11 (Cont’d)
Variables
accuracy_change

(1)

(2)

5.0147***
(16.83)
0.0068**
(2.36)
0.0048***
(3.19)
-0.0128**
(-2.44)
-0.0000
(-0.35)
-0.0001
(-1.13)
-0.0063
(-0.95)
-0.0328
(-1.37)
0.0004
(0.03)
0.0096
(0.38)
-0.0610***
(-5.69)
-0.0015
(-0.74)

constant

0.0221
(0.49)

5.0193***
(16.85)
0.0034
(0.72)
0.0050***
(3.25)
-0.0127**
(-2.43)
-0.0000
(-0.26)
-0.0001
(-1.15)
-0.0082
(-1.18)
-0.0316
(-1.32)
0.0009
(0.06)
0.0102
(0.40)
-0.0625***
(-5.76)
-0.0014
(-0.67)
0.0068
(0.90)
0.0139
(0.30)

Industry fixed effect
Year fixed effect
observations
Adj. R2

Yes
Yes
1,051
0.292

Yes
Yes
1,051
0.292

horizon_change
firm_exp
star_dummy
broker_size
ana_firm_coverage
revenue_growth
loss_dummy
tangibility
manu_dummy
b2m
mkv
lambda
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Table 12: Change in forecast dispersion
This table reports descriptive statistics for 1,326 firm observations in Panel A and
361 firm observations in Panel B both from 2007 to 2013. I restrict the sample to
visiting analysts’ forecasts issued within 30 days after the visiting event. Dispersion
is defined as the ratio of the standard deviation of analysts’ current-fiscal-year annual
earnings per share forecasts to the absolute value of the mean forecasts. disp_after
refers to the dispersion of forecasts within 30 days after the visiting forecasts (group
1 in Figure 4) while disp_before refers to the dispersion of forecasts during 30 days
prior to the visiting forecast (group 2 in Figure 4). I further require there are at least
two forecasts in both periods in order to compute dispersion. In panel B, dispersions
are computed using the same time period but with regard to visiting analyst’s prior
non-visiting forecast (group 3 and 4 in Figure 4). Dispersions are winsorized at the
10% and 90% levels. The t-statistics computed are reported in parentheses. ***
denotes significance at the 0.01 level.
Panel A: Change in firm level dispersion for visiting analyst’s visiting forecast
Variables
Obs
Mean
disp_before
disp_after

1,326
1,326

Before - After

0.0699
0.0648
0.0051***
(2.31)

Panel B: Change in firm level dispersion for visiting analyst’s prior non-visiting
forecast
Variables
Obs
Mean
disp_before
disp_after

361
361

Before - After

0.0644
0.0623
0.0021
(0.59)
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Table 13: Change in common information and private information
This table reports descriptive statistics for 1,313 firm observations in Panel A and 360 firm observations in Panel B both from 2007 to 2013. I
restrict the sample to visiting analysts’ forecasts issued within 30 days after the visiting event. common_after is computed by using forecasts
within 30 days after the visiting forecasts (group 1 in Figure 4) while common_before is computed by using forecasts during 30 days prior to the
visiting forecast (group 2 in Figure 4). private_after and private_after are computed by using the same sample respectively. I further require there
are at least two forecasts in both periods in order to compute the variance of forecast. In panel B, variables are computed using the same time
period but with regard to visiting analyst’s prior non-visiting forecast (group 3 and 4 in Figure 4). All variables are winsorized at the 10% and 90%
levels. The t-statistics computed are reported in parentheses. *** denotes significance at the 0.01 level.
common

=

𝐷
𝑁

(SE− )
1
[(1− )𝐷+𝑆𝐸]2
𝑁

,

private =

D
1
[(1− )𝐷+𝑆𝐸]2
𝑁

Where N is the number of analysts’ forecasts. D is the variance of the analysts’ forecasts. SE is the squared error in the mean forecast, computed
as the squared difference between the mean forecasted EPS and actual EPS i.e.(Mean forecasted EPS – Actual EPS)2.
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Table 13 (cont’d)

Panel A: Change in common and private information for visiting analyst’s visiting forecast
Variables
Obs
Mean
common_before
common_after

1,313
1,313

Before - After

106.93
123.10

private_before
private_after

-16.17***
(-2.65)

Before - After

Panel B: Change in common and private information for visiting analyst’s non-visiting forecast
Variables
Obs
Mean
common_before
common_after
Before - After

360
360

99.66
113.34

private_before
private_after

-13.68
(-1.30)

Before - After
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Obs

Mean

1,313
1,313

165.16
161.72
-3.43
(-0.31)

Obs

Mean

360
360

194.44
186.61
7.83
(0.33)

Table 14: Change in forecast error of consensus forecast
This table reports descriptive statistics for 2,935 firm observations from 2007 to 2013.
I restrict the sample to visiting analysts’ forecasts issued within 30 days after the
visiting event. Following forecasts of the visiting forecasts are identified as the
forecasts issued within 30 days after the issuance of the visiting forecast. Following
forecasts of the non-visiting forecasts are identified as the forecasts issued during 30
days before the issuance of the visiting forecasts. I further require there is at least one
forecast in both the prior and post period of visiting forecast. consensus_before is
computed by using forecasts issued 30 days before the visiting forecast, and is
defined as the absolute difference between the consensus EPS forecast and actual
EPS, scaled by the stock price at the beginning of the year. consensus_after is
computed by using forecasts issued 30 days after the visiting forecast, and is defined
as the absolute difference between the consensus EPS forecast and actual EPS, scaled
by the stock price at the beginning of the year. Variables are winsorized at the 10%
and 90% levels. The t-statistics computed are reported in parentheses. ** denotes
significance at the 0.05 level.

Panel A: Forecast error change of consensus forecast (visiting forecast)
Variables
Obs
Mean
consensus_before
consensus_after

2,935
2,935

Before - After

0.0077
0.0073
0.0004**
(2.27)

Panel B: Forecast error change of consensus forecast (non-visiting forecast)
Variables
Obs
Mean
consensus_before
consensus_after

490
490

Before - After

0.0059
0.0058
0.0001
(0.34)
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Table 15: Difference in forecast accuracy between visiting forecasts and prior consensus forecasts
This table reports descriptive statistics for 3,832 visiting forecast observations from 2007 to 2013. I restrict the sample to visiting analysts’
forecasts issued within 30 days after the visiting event. Only the first visiting forecast is kept if the site visit is conducted by multiple analysts. I
further require there is at least one forecast in the month prior to the visiting forecast in order to compute the consensus forecast. The prior
consensus forecast is defined as the mean EPS forecast in the month prior to the visiting forecast. consensus_fe is computed as the absolute
difference between the consensus EPS forecast and actual EPS, scaled by the stock price at the beginning of the year. visiting_fe is computed as
the absolute difference between the visiting EPS forecast and actual EPS, scaled by the stock price at the beginning of the year. The t-statistics
computed are reported in parentheses. *** denotes significance at the 0.01 level.

Variables

Obs

Mean

consensus_fe
visiting_fe

3,832
3,832

0.0101
0.0093

consensus - visiting

0.0008***
(4.82)
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